Post by Sapphire Capital on Jul 11, 2008 5:58:49 GMT 4
Political Economy of Multi-Level Tax Assignments in Latin American Countries: Earmarked Revenue Versus Tax Autonomy
GIORGIO BROSIO
University of Turin
EHTISHAM AHMAD
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
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March 2008
IMF Working Paper No. 08/71
Abstract:
A weakness of decentralization and overall tax reforms in Latin America is the lack of attention to adequate taxation at the subnational government. A reliance on shared taxes with extensive earmarking leads to weak subnational accountability and soft budget constraints. The paper explores the options for expanding subnational taxation in Latin America. A range of subnational tax instruments might be considered, but interactions between new tax assignments and the system of transfers is important from a political economy perspective.
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/wp0871.pdf?abstractid=1115602&mirid=1
GIORGIO BROSIO
University of Turin
EHTISHAM AHMAD
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
March 2008
IMF Working Paper No. 08/71
Abstract:
A weakness of decentralization and overall tax reforms in Latin America is the lack of attention to adequate taxation at the subnational government. A reliance on shared taxes with extensive earmarking leads to weak subnational accountability and soft budget constraints. The paper explores the options for expanding subnational taxation in Latin America. A range of subnational tax instruments might be considered, but interactions between new tax assignments and the system of transfers is important from a political economy perspective.
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/wp0871.pdf?abstractid=1115602&mirid=1