Post by Sapphire Capital on Aug 19, 2008 2:10:21 GMT 4
Judicial Independence and Party Politics in the Kelsenian Constitutional Courts: The Case of Portugal
Sofia Amaral Garcia
University of Bologna - Faculty of Economics
Nuno Garoupa
University of Illinois College of Law; IMDEA Ciencias Sociales; University of Manchester - School of Law; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Veronica Grembi
Facoltà di Economia, Università Cattolica di Milano; Istituto di Economia e Finanza, Facoltà di Giurisprudenza, University of Rome La Sapienza
July 7, 2008
U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE08-21
Abstract:
In this paper we test to what extent the Kelsenian-type of constitutional judges are independent from political parties by studying of the Portuguese Constitutional Court. The results yield three main conclusions. First, constitutional judges in Portugal are quite sensitive to their political affiliations and their political party's presence in government when voting. Second, peer pressure is very relevant. Third, the 1997 reform that was enacted to increase judicial independence has had no robust statistically significant effect.
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1156281_code517200.pdf?abstractid=1156281&mirid=2
Sofia Amaral Garcia
University of Bologna - Faculty of Economics
Nuno Garoupa
University of Illinois College of Law; IMDEA Ciencias Sociales; University of Manchester - School of Law; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Veronica Grembi
Facoltà di Economia, Università Cattolica di Milano; Istituto di Economia e Finanza, Facoltà di Giurisprudenza, University of Rome La Sapienza
July 7, 2008
U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE08-21
Abstract:
In this paper we test to what extent the Kelsenian-type of constitutional judges are independent from political parties by studying of the Portuguese Constitutional Court. The results yield three main conclusions. First, constitutional judges in Portugal are quite sensitive to their political affiliations and their political party's presence in government when voting. Second, peer pressure is very relevant. Third, the 1997 reform that was enacted to increase judicial independence has had no robust statistically significant effect.
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1156281_code517200.pdf?abstractid=1156281&mirid=2