Post by Sapphire Capital on Aug 28, 2008 20:08:50 GMT 4
Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors
Stephen J. Choi
New York University - School of Law
Jill E. Fisch
University of Pennsylvania Law School
Marcel Kahan
New York University - School of Law
August 11, 2008
U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 08-18
Abstract:
Using a dataset of proxy recommendations and voting results for uncontested director elections from 2005 and 2006 at S&P 1500 companies, we examine how advisors make their recommendations. Of the four firms we study, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), Proxy Governance (PGI), Glass Lewis (GL), and Egan Jones (EJ), ISS has the largest market share and is widely regarded as the most influential. We find that the four proxy advisory firms differ substantially from each other both in their willingness to issue a withhold recommendation and in the factors that affect their recommendation.
It is not clear that these differences, or the bases for the recommendations, are transparent to the institutions that purchase proxy advisory services. If the differences are not apparent, investors may not accurately perceive the information content associated with a withhold recommendation, and investors may rely on those recommendations based on an erroneous understanding of the basis for that recommendation. To the extent that proxy advisors aggregate information for the purpose of facilitating an informed shareholder vote, these limitations may impair the effectiveness of the shareholder franchise. If the differences are apparent, our results show that investors, though selecting a proxy advisor, can indirectly choose the bases for their vote on directors. To that extent, it is likely that proxy advisory firms will retain more investor clients if their recommendations are based on factors that their clients consider relevant.
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1225963_code711466.pdf?abstractid=1225963&mirid=2
Stephen J. Choi
New York University - School of Law
Jill E. Fisch
University of Pennsylvania Law School
Marcel Kahan
New York University - School of Law
August 11, 2008
U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 08-18
Abstract:
Using a dataset of proxy recommendations and voting results for uncontested director elections from 2005 and 2006 at S&P 1500 companies, we examine how advisors make their recommendations. Of the four firms we study, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), Proxy Governance (PGI), Glass Lewis (GL), and Egan Jones (EJ), ISS has the largest market share and is widely regarded as the most influential. We find that the four proxy advisory firms differ substantially from each other both in their willingness to issue a withhold recommendation and in the factors that affect their recommendation.
It is not clear that these differences, or the bases for the recommendations, are transparent to the institutions that purchase proxy advisory services. If the differences are not apparent, investors may not accurately perceive the information content associated with a withhold recommendation, and investors may rely on those recommendations based on an erroneous understanding of the basis for that recommendation. To the extent that proxy advisors aggregate information for the purpose of facilitating an informed shareholder vote, these limitations may impair the effectiveness of the shareholder franchise. If the differences are apparent, our results show that investors, though selecting a proxy advisor, can indirectly choose the bases for their vote on directors. To that extent, it is likely that proxy advisory firms will retain more investor clients if their recommendations are based on factors that their clients consider relevant.
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1225963_code711466.pdf?abstractid=1225963&mirid=2