Post by Sapphire Capital on Sept 18, 2008 4:42:44 GMT 4
What Determines the Financing Decision in Corporate Takeovers: Cost of Capital, Agency Problems, or the Means of Payment?
Marina Martynova
University of Sheffield Management School; Tilburg University - Department of Finance
Luc Renneboog
Tilburg University - Department of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
August 1, 2008
ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 215/2008
CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2008-66
TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2008-028
Abstract:
While the means of payment in takeovers has been a focal point in the takeover literature, what has largely been ignored is the analysis of how the takeover bid is financed and what its impact is on the expected value creation of the takeover. This paper investigates the sources of transaction financing in European corporate takeovers launched during the period 1993-2001 (the fifth takeover wave). Using a unique dataset, we show that the external sources of financing (debt and equity) are frequently employed in takeovers involving cash payments. Acquisitions with the same means of payment but different sources of transaction funding are quite distinct. For instance, a significantly negative price revision following the announcement of a takeover is not unique to the equity-paid M&As; it is also observed in any other deals that involve equity financing (including cash-paid and mixed-paid M&As). Also, acquisitions financed with internally generated funds significantly underperform those financed with. Our multinomial logit and nested logit analyses show that the takeover financing decision is influenced by the bidder's pecking order preferences, its growth potential, and its corporate governance environment, all of which are related to the cost of external capital. There is also evidence that the choice of equity versus internal cash or debt financing is influenced by the bidder's strategic preferences with respect to the means of payment. We find no evidence of financing decisions driven by agency conflicts between managers and shareholders or between shareholders and creditors.
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1192566_code468680.pdf?abstractid=1192566&mirid=1
Marina Martynova
University of Sheffield Management School; Tilburg University - Department of Finance
Luc Renneboog
Tilburg University - Department of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
August 1, 2008
ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 215/2008
CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2008-66
TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2008-028
Abstract:
While the means of payment in takeovers has been a focal point in the takeover literature, what has largely been ignored is the analysis of how the takeover bid is financed and what its impact is on the expected value creation of the takeover. This paper investigates the sources of transaction financing in European corporate takeovers launched during the period 1993-2001 (the fifth takeover wave). Using a unique dataset, we show that the external sources of financing (debt and equity) are frequently employed in takeovers involving cash payments. Acquisitions with the same means of payment but different sources of transaction funding are quite distinct. For instance, a significantly negative price revision following the announcement of a takeover is not unique to the equity-paid M&As; it is also observed in any other deals that involve equity financing (including cash-paid and mixed-paid M&As). Also, acquisitions financed with internally generated funds significantly underperform those financed with. Our multinomial logit and nested logit analyses show that the takeover financing decision is influenced by the bidder's pecking order preferences, its growth potential, and its corporate governance environment, all of which are related to the cost of external capital. There is also evidence that the choice of equity versus internal cash or debt financing is influenced by the bidder's strategic preferences with respect to the means of payment. We find no evidence of financing decisions driven by agency conflicts between managers and shareholders or between shareholders and creditors.
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1192566_code468680.pdf?abstractid=1192566&mirid=1