Post by Sapphire Capital on Nov 26, 2008 22:00:55 GMT 4
Risk Pricing and Flexibility in Acquisitions: The Economic Impact of Material-Adverse-Change (MACs) Clauses
Antonio J. Macias
Purdue University
November 22, 2008
AFA 2009 San Francisco Meetings Paper
Abstract:
Material-Adverse-Change (MACs) clauses in merger agreements allow for the promotion of efficient renegotiation and allocation of risk between the target and acquirer over the time period from the announcement to the completion of the acquisition. MACs, used in more than 90% of acquisitions in my sample, show a high level of customization through the Material-Adverse-Event (MAE) exclusions, which limit the acquirers abandonment option defined through MACs. In this paper, I show the economic consequences of MACs are significant in at least four ways. First, the number of Material-Adverse-Event (MAE) exclusions is negatively related to the premium offered to the target. Second, acquisitions with more MAE exclusions have narrower arbitrage spreads. Third, limiting the abandonment option through MAE exclusions significantly reduces the probability and hazard rates of renegotiation and termination. Finally, acquirers that renegotiate after the target experienced a firm-specific MAE obtain, on average, a 15% reduction in the premium paid. Results imply acquirers are willing to pay more to be able to terminate or renegotiate if necessary. These findings indicate that MACs have an economically meaningful impact on the takeover process.
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1305603_code391829.pdf?abstractid=1108792&mirid=1
Antonio J. Macias
Purdue University
November 22, 2008
AFA 2009 San Francisco Meetings Paper
Abstract:
Material-Adverse-Change (MACs) clauses in merger agreements allow for the promotion of efficient renegotiation and allocation of risk between the target and acquirer over the time period from the announcement to the completion of the acquisition. MACs, used in more than 90% of acquisitions in my sample, show a high level of customization through the Material-Adverse-Event (MAE) exclusions, which limit the acquirers abandonment option defined through MACs. In this paper, I show the economic consequences of MACs are significant in at least four ways. First, the number of Material-Adverse-Event (MAE) exclusions is negatively related to the premium offered to the target. Second, acquisitions with more MAE exclusions have narrower arbitrage spreads. Third, limiting the abandonment option through MAE exclusions significantly reduces the probability and hazard rates of renegotiation and termination. Finally, acquirers that renegotiate after the target experienced a firm-specific MAE obtain, on average, a 15% reduction in the premium paid. Results imply acquirers are willing to pay more to be able to terminate or renegotiate if necessary. These findings indicate that MACs have an economically meaningful impact on the takeover process.
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1305603_code391829.pdf?abstractid=1108792&mirid=1