Post by Sapphire Capital on Nov 28, 2008 20:59:29 GMT 4
Motions for Lead Plaintiff in Securities Class Actions
Stephen J. Choi
New York University - School of Law
November 2, 2008
NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 08-53
Abstract:
Using a dataset of securities class actions filed from 2003 to 2005, this paper assesses the effect of the lead plaintiff presumption enacted as part of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) on agency costs between lead counsel for the class and class members. Examining the pre-trial motions for lead plaintiff status for each class action, the paper reports evidence that plaintiffs' attorneys retain significant control over the selection of lead plaintiff, forming groups of plaintiffs to ensure their selection as lead counsel and cutting side deals to determine the selection of lead plaintiff and thereby lead counsel. Using proxies for where plaintiffs' attorneys have relatively greater influence over the selected lead plaintiff, the paper reports that plaintiffs' attorneys with greater power are able to negotiate higher attorneys' fees as a percentage of the recovery and work fewer hours.
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1304187_code419245.pdf?abstractid=1293926&mirid=1
Stephen J. Choi
New York University - School of Law
November 2, 2008
NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 08-53
Abstract:
Using a dataset of securities class actions filed from 2003 to 2005, this paper assesses the effect of the lead plaintiff presumption enacted as part of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) on agency costs between lead counsel for the class and class members. Examining the pre-trial motions for lead plaintiff status for each class action, the paper reports evidence that plaintiffs' attorneys retain significant control over the selection of lead plaintiff, forming groups of plaintiffs to ensure their selection as lead counsel and cutting side deals to determine the selection of lead plaintiff and thereby lead counsel. Using proxies for where plaintiffs' attorneys have relatively greater influence over the selected lead plaintiff, the paper reports that plaintiffs' attorneys with greater power are able to negotiate higher attorneys' fees as a percentage of the recovery and work fewer hours.
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1304187_code419245.pdf?abstractid=1293926&mirid=1