Afghan/Pakistan: Surging Towards Disaster

[T Burghardt]

Surging Towards Disaster in the "Afpak Theatre"
From Wikileaks


February 22, 2009

By Tom Burghardt

On February 18, President Barack Obama ordered 17,000 additional U.S. troops deployed to Afghanistan. Obama's announcement will result in a major escalation of America's bloody occupation of that war-ravaged country.

Currently, some 36,000 U.S. troops are in Afghanistan, including some 6,000 sent in early January under orders by the outgoing Bush regime. In addition to U.S. forces, 32,000 troops from other NATO countries and a mix of "private military contractors" (armed mercenaries) occupy the Central Asian nation.

When coupled with increasingly bellicose rhetoric from the Pentagon and military strikes inside Pakistan, the prospects for regional war--with incalculable risks for the people of Central- and South Asia--have put paid Obama's electoral hyperbole that his would be a "change" administration.

In a brief written statement issued Tuesday by the White House, Obama declared that "the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan demands urgent attention and swift action. The Taliban is resurgent in Afghanistan, and al Qaeda supports the insurgency and threatens America from its safe-haven along the Pakistani border."

Responding to "a months old" request by "General McKiernan and supported by Secretary Gates, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander of Central Command," Obama will soon dispatch a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (8,000 troops), an Army Stryker Brigade (4,000 soldiers) and 5,000 support troops.

Claiming that increased troop levels "will contribute to the security of the Afghan people," the White House studiously ignores reports from the United Nations, international human rights organizations--and from NATO itself--that the number of civilians killed by all armed actors increased dramatically over the previous year.

A confidential report titled "Metrics Brief, 2007-2008," was published by Wikileaks. Prepared by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for Afghanistan, the 12 page dossier "reveals that civilian deaths from the war in Afghanistan have increased by 46% over the past year." According to the global whistleblowers,

The report shows a dramatic escalation of the war and civil disorder. Coalition deaths increased by 35%, assassinations and kidnappings by 50% and attacks on the Kabul based Government of Hamid Karzai also more than doubled, rising a massive 119%.

The report highlights huge increases on attacks aimed at Coalition forces, including a 27% increase in IED attacks, a 40% rise in rifle and rocket fire and an increase in surface to air fire of 67%.

According to the report, outside of the capital Kabul only one in two families had access to even the most basic health care, and only one in two children had access to a school.

While the majority of civilian deaths were attributed by the United Nations to the criminal actions of the Taliban and the Afghan-Arab database of disposable Western intelligence assets known as al-Qaeda, some 828 of 2,118 civilians killed in 2008 were the result of indiscriminate attacks by the Afghan military, U.S. Air Force bombing and berserker American Special Forces units engaged in "counterterrorism" and "counternarcotics" operations. According to The New York Times,

The report singled out special forces and other military units operating outside the normal chains of command. That means their presence and movements are not always known by regular field commanders.

Special forces groups like Navy Seals and paramilitary units operated by the CIA often conduct raids in Afghanistan, and often at night.

The report also said that airstrikes that went awry were often those that were called in by troops under attack.

The United Nations report helps shed light on one of the most divisive issues between the American-led coalition and the Afghan government of Mr. Karzai. (Dexter Filkins, "Afghan Civilian Deaths Rose 40 Percent in 2008," The New York Times, February 18, 2009)

The growing carnage on the ground reflects the political crisis facing the new administration as capitalism's economic meltdown compel our corporatist masters to grab as much of the world's resources as possible to stanch the economic bleed out.

But as in Iraq and the Middle East generally however, the Obama administration's "surge" across Central Asian will prove quixotic--and deadly.

Kyrgyzstan Gives America the Boot

As the politico-military situation rapidly deteriorates, how the Pentagon will keep "surged" troops resupplied is fast becoming a looming nightmare.

With critical supply routes from Pakistan cut by Afghan Talibs and Pakistani Taliban fighters, who have launched coordinated attacks with Central Asian and Arab al-Qaeda guerrillas, the virtual closure of the Khyber Pass in the North-West Frontier Province has fueled a growing logistical crisis. Prior to last December's offensive by insurgents, some 75% of supplies for NATO forces flowed into Afghanistan along this route.

Adding to NATO's headaches, on February 18 Kyrgyzstan's rubber-stamp parliament voted to close the Manas Airbase near the capital Bishkek. According to The Guardian, Wednesday's vote followed "a backroom deal two weeks ago between the country's president, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, and Russia's president, Dmitry Medvedev."

The Americans have six months to pack up and vacate the premises.

The kleptocratic Bakiyev regime has been promised a $2.15 billion loan and a debt write-off by Moscow in a move intended to wrest concessions from the United States to keep the military hardware flowing. Asia Times reported February 20,

In the end, transit salvation for the US and NATO is indeed coming from no one else but Russia--but on Moscow's terms: this means Russia possibly using its own military planes to airlift the supplies. A deceptively charming Medvedev has been on the record identifying "very positive signs" in the new US-Russia chess match. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has been on the record saying transit of US and NATO non-military supplies through Russia begins in effect only a few days after the 20th anniversary of the Soviets leaving Kabul. (Pepe Escobar, "Obama, Osama and Medvedev," Asia Times Online, February 20, 2009)

As investigative journalist Pepe Escobar points out, "the price" that the United States and NATO will pay to have their supplies arrive from Russia is being made painfully clear to Washington: "no more encirclement, no more NATO extension, no more anti-missile shield in the Czech Republic and Poland for protection against non-existent Iranian missiles. All this has to be negotiated in detail."

But in a potential move seen as a maneuver to bypass Moscow, The Independent reported that "the new US administration had indicated that it was prepared to talk to Iran about the Afghan situation."

No friend of the Sunni-based insurgency next door, nor of U.S.-backed jihadi groups such as Jundullah attacking from Pakistan, Tehran may be willing to cut a deal with Washington. Independent journalist Kim Sengupta writes that "Italy, which assumes the presidency of the G8 this year, said that Tehran would be invited to participate in a summit on Afghanistan. The Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini said: 'We want to consider how to involve Iran, not whether to involve Iran'."

But how this will play out may be determined by America's stationary aircraft carrier in the Middle East, Israel, and that country's "naval task force" in Washington, the powerful Israel lobby. And with Benjamin Netanyahu's far-right Likud party given the nod by Israeli President Shimon Peres "to take the lead" in forming the next government, it's an even bet that Bibi may cut a deal with Avigdor Lieberman's neofascist Yisrael Beiteinu party. Netanyahu and Lieberman have both threatened to bomb Iran's civilian nuclear facilities, and have called that nation Israel's number one "national security threat."

While Washington's chattering classes prattle on about the need to "fight them over there, so we don't have to fight them here," the sad reality for the Afghan people is that the Obama administration and their corporatist masters don't give a hoot about their suffering, the unprecedented "surge" in heroin production, the rise and rise of organized crime-linked "Islamic fundamentalists," or for that matter, bringing al-Qaeda to ground. It's all hot air designed to get the American people on-board as imperialism escalates the "right war" in Central- and South Asia.

With the 9/11 attacks as a backdrop--and pretext--for carrying out a long-planned military intervention to conqueror Afghanistan, either through proxies (remember the enthusiasm in petroleum board rooms when the Taliban seized Kabul in 1996!) or now, by installing a narco regime amenable to American demands, the unspoken project remains what it has always been: the "sole superpower's" hegemonic control over the vast oil and gas reserves of Central Asia.

Pakistan, Jihadis and America's Killer Drones

Meanwhile, on the "Pak" side of the "Afpak theatre" America's former "best friends forever," the Pakistani Taliban grouped under the banner of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Tehrik Nifaz Shariat-i-Muhammadi (Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law, TNSM) have been doing some "surging" of their own.

Having successfully concluded a "truce" with the government of President Asif Ali Zardari in the North-West Frontier Province's Malakand District, the nominally secular Pakistan Peoples Party has ceded the political ground to Army and Inter Services Intelligence agency-linked militants with long-standing ties to international terrorist outfits and drug trafficking cartels. In other words, American allies.

But before the ink on the agreement had even dried, a television journalist with Pakistan's Geo network, Musa Khan Khel, covering TNSM head honcho Maulana Sufi Mohammed's triumphant entry into Mingora February 17, was brutally murdered. Riddled with bullets, his nearly decapitated body was found on the side of a road shortly after the TNSM leader announced that "peace" had come to the Swat Valley. Khel, according to reports, had been seeking an interview with TTP "emir" Maulana Fazlullah.

The News reported February 20 that TNSM leaders are meeting with their TTP counterparts to seal the deal to lay down their arms in lieu of the imposition of Sharia law in Malakand.

In 2001, the "peacemaker" and self-proclaimed "Sharia-lover" had led some 10,000 untrained volunteers across the border into Afghanistan to fight the American-led narcotrafficking Northern Alliance during the initial stages of the U.S. invasion. Drawn from madrassas across Pakistan as disposable cannon-fodder for the ISI, thousands were killed.

In the aftermath of the TTP and the Army's bloody operations Swat lay in ruins, its people terrorized and its infrastructure all but destroyed. Describing the region as a "hell-hole of bodies and ruin," The Sunday Times reports that

In the former mountain resort of Malam Jabba, where skiing thrived when the surrounding Swat Valley was an international attraction, one can still see the remnants of the Pakistan Tourism Development Corporation's flagship hotel. The building was blown up by the Taliban because it was being used for "un-Islamic activities".

Hundreds of other hotels in the valley have been destroyed or forced to close after threats from the militants. (Daud Khattakis, "Into a Taliban wasteland of blood and fear," The Sunday Times, February 22, 2009)

But the destruction of critical infrastructure that fueled the region's economy is but the visible manifestation of a virtual reign of terror that grips Swat Valley. Khattakis writes:

What I found in Swat was a hell-hole. Suicide bombings, car bombs and artillery have scarred the valley's roads and buildings. The charred remains of hospitals and even a madrasah (seminary) litter the landscape.

Nearly 200 schools have been destroyed, all girls over the age of eight are banned from lessons and, in a symbol of the Taliban's hatred of learning, the public library in Mingora has been wrecked.

The Taliban have banned music and dancing, television and internet cafes. Women cannot leave home without wearing a burqa, the all-encompassing robe. Justice has been enforced with floggings and public executions. (The Sunday Times, ibid.)

In the heart of Mingora's bazaar, Green Square is now known as Khooni Chowk, or bloody square "because of the public executions carried out there by Taliban who leave the bullet-riddled bodies of police and soldiers for all to see."

One wonders what justification "Sharia-lover" Sufi Mohammed and his sociopathic son-in-law Fazlullah have for butchering whole families, including children, who simply wish to be left in peace?

According to multiple reports in the Pakistani media, since the TTP's violent take over of the region, organized crime gangs have flourished and car-jackings, armed robberies, kidnappings, rapes and murders as well as an explosive increase in the drug trade have turned Swat into an post-apocalyptic landscape. Like their American counterparts in crime, the message of TTP "emirs" seems to be: "Kill 'em all, and let God sort them out."

But here as elsewhere, the rise of reactionary fundamentalism has far more to do with failing state structures than with religious enthusiasm. Incapable of providing food, employment, housing and health care to its citizens, Pakistani elites, like corporate grifters everywhere, undermine their position by selling-off economic assets to well-connected cronies and ceding educational and social welfare services to "faith-based" groups, as in the U.S.

In this context, The Nation reported February 18 that the Cabinet Committee on Privatization approved the (fire) sale sell-off of some 21 state-owned enterprises, including "four power companies and other state-owned entities including SME Bank, National Power Construction Company, Pakistan Railways and Pakistan Post."

Utterly bankrupt and bereft of imagination when its comes to ameliorating the horrendous economic and social hardships faced by Pakistani workers and farmers, the bourgeois PPP government following "advice" from their mentors in Washington, will instead line the pockets of their "constituents," the multinational corporations and the comprador elites who do their bidding.

The Swat truce follows revelations by The Times that the "CIA is secretly using an airbase in southern Pakistan to launch the Predator drones that observe and attack al-Qaeda and Taleban militants on the Pakistani side of the border with Afghanistan."

While the Pakistani government has demanded that the U.S. halt drone attacks in the area, The Times discovered "that the CIA has been using the Shamsi airfield--originally built by Arab sheikhs for falconry expeditions in the southwestern province of Baluchistan--for at least a year."

The New York-based whistleblowing intelligence and security website Cryptome published a series of satellite images as part of their "Eyeball" series on February 18. One image, captured in 2006 before construction of a huge hangar meant to conceal America's robot killing machines was completed, show Predator drones on the Shamsi air strip.

According to Cryptome's anonymous correspondent, "This is a very capable base facility with a large hangar in addition to the two Predator support hangars. Nearby is a large secured compound (appears empty) which could support up to a battalion of special ops and associated command and control. The large parking area inside the compound is perfect to land choppers and leave with relative security. All security measures seem fresh."

As I reported February 16, "U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), the chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, dropped a bombshell when she revealed that CIA Predator drones are flown from an airbase in Pakistan." Feinstein's disclosure came during hearings February 12 before the Senate Intelligence Committee. While the CIA and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) have refused to comment, unnamed "U.S. intelligence officials" described the senator's statement as "accurate."

Despite these revelations, Pakistan's Defense Minister Chaudry Ahmad Mukhtar continues to deny "that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is controlling drone attacks from the Shamsi base in Balochistan, and said Pakistan had no secret understanding with the US to use bases in Pakistan to carry out attacks in the Tribal Areas, according to a February 20 report in Daily Times.

Mukhtar said: "Certain news reports claiming that the CIA runs predator flights from the Shamsi Airbase in Balochistan are baseless ... Pakistan has no such understanding with the US to allow it to use its bases for predator attacks."

How the Defense Minister squares his denial with inescapable facts on the ground is another matter entirely. But revelations over the CIA's use of Shamsi Airbase may be the least of the Defense Ministry's problems.

"In a dramatic development," according to The News, "three prominent Pakistani militant commanders--Baitullah Mehsud, Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Maulvi Nazeer--on Friday set aside their differences and promised to jointly fight their enemy in future."

Two of the three Pakistani Taliban leaders were considered "pro-government" and had been recruited to fight Mehsud's TTP and their al-Qaeda allies but have since been alienated from the state due to persistent Predator attacks by the CIA from bases provided by Pakistan. The News reports,

If the three men, who now rule South and North Waziristan tribal region in true sense, got united, they could give a tough time to the government in future.

The militants from Wana said now they had understood Pakistan's divide and rule policy, and decided to get united and fight together against it in future. "Pakistan caused more losses to the Mujahideen than the US. It handed over 700 Arab Mujahideen to the US and jailed our people," the commander alleged. (Mushtaq Yusufzai, "Top militant commanders resolve rift," The News, February 21, 2009)

Islamabad's double-game with the imperialist Dracula on the one hand and the jihadi Frankenstein on the other demonstrates, if nothing else, the impervious nature of the existing political system to "change" on all sides of the "Afpak problem."

Barring a dramatic transformation of the political state of affairs, the bill for American and Pakistani duplicity is coming due, and it will be the people of South Asia who will pay a heavy price.

[MMM]

NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO ISAF
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MEDIA OPERATIONS CENTRE (MOC)
Press and Media Service, NATO HQ BRUSSELS
T: [phone] / 10 F: [phone]
Email : [e-mail]
NATO IN AFGHANISTAN
MASTER NARRATIVE AS AT 6 October 2008
This guidance document is designed to assist all those who play a part in explaining the situation in
Afghanistan and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, but especially those who deal
with the media. Ownership of this document is shared between NATO HQ, SHAPE, JFC Brunssum and HQ
ISAF but certain issues should be led at the strategic level (NATO HQ /SHAPE); these are annotated as
such. The Current Issues section will be updated according to the level of Alliance or public interest at the
time of issue.
For ease of identification, major additions/amendments to the 18 September 2008 edition
are highlighted.
Headline Messages
Afghanistan remains NATO’s number one priority. This is not an operation of choice, it is one of
necessity. We are in Afghanistan for the long term under a United Nations mandate for as long
as we are needed and welcomed by the Afghan people.
The significant increase in security incidents this year is due to an increased use of asymmetric
tactics by insurgents, an increase in the operational presence of ISAF and ANSF, and an
increased freedom of action for insurgents operating from inside Pakistan. Pakistan must be
part of a regional solution to the challenges faced in Afghanistan. NATO/ISAF is strengthening
political contacts with Pakistan and increasing military cooperation through tripartite meetings
at all levels, an enhanced ISAF-Pakistan Liaison Team, and practical coordination measures.
The Afghan National Security Forces and ISAF are making progress on the ground. The
militants1 do not and cannot hold ground where they are challenged by ANSF and ISAF.
1
Opposing Militant Forces is the correct term but is not suitable for use with the media. Depending on
the audience and the group being referred to, the phrases militants/insurgents/extremists/Taleban
extremists/enemies of Afghanistan may be used, see also para 36.
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The Afghan National Army is a significant success story. It continues to grow in number,
competence, and capabilities and is approved to grow to 122,000 by 20122. Today, the majority
of operations involving the ANA are Afghan-led.
Progress in security is sustainable only with progress in all three fields of the Afghan National
Development Strategy. Good governance, including the rule of law and human rights, together
with economical and social development require the coordinated effort of the International
Community with ever increasing Afghan ownership.
To minimise the risk of harming civilians COM ISAF has mandated his forces to take all
measures deemed necessary to avoid the loss of life. These include directions on using
airpower. A new methodology of civilian casualty reporting has also been established.
Within means and capabilities, ISAF is supporting ANSF planning, coordinating and executing
security for the voter registration process during the period of October 2008 to February 2009.
ISAF will provide third-line security, backing up the Afghan National Police and Army in
supporting this Afghan-led process. A security plan was signed by the chairman of the Afghan
Independent Election Commission along with representatives from the MoI, MoD, and ISAF on
24 Aug 08.
ISAF’s next phased operations plan, Operation TOLO, will commence on November 1 and will
run through April 1. It will build on the current Operation SHAMSHIR and will advance our
shape, clear, hold, and build strategy by focusing efforts on key population areas and
infrastructure, securing the population and separating the insurgency from it.
Public Affairs Guidance - Key Points
Public Affairs Officers should be aware of upcoming national debates. Notwithstanding,
NATO/ISAF PAO should avoid any comments on positions presented in those debates.
Questions regarding national commitments should be referred to SHAPE and NATO HQ.
Messaging on the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) for ISAF should focus
on efforts to bolster ANA capabilities through the provision of more OMLTs and not speculate
on possible future revisions of the CJSOR.
NOTE to PAO: If pressed, reference to force capability deficiencies rather than estimated
numbers should be made. In general, issues concerning force generation should not be
debated in public.
Commanders should use the chain of command to request more troops, not the media.
2
Approved by the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board IX held in Kabul, Afghanistan on 10 Sep 08.
The figure 122,000 refers to operational units. The overall figure including trainers, enablers, etc. will reach
134,000.
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It is important to emphasize that our actions are in support of the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA)3. To this end, every opportunity should be taken to enable the
Afghan authorities to articulate successes to the public.
NATO does not use body counts as a measure of success.
INDEX
SECTION I - CURRENT ISSUES
1. Characterisation of the Security Situation
2. Transfer of Lead Security Responsibility in Kabul
3. Civilian casualties / Human Rights
4. Use of Airpower
5. NATO Support to the Afghan National Army (ANA)
6. Kajaki Dam project
7. ISAF support to Voter Registration and Elections
8. AWACS Capability in Support of ISAF
9. The Role of Pakistan
10. Launch of Operation TOLO
11. US Command and Control (C2) arrangements
SECTION II – ENDURING ISSUES
12. NATO/ISAF Mission
13. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
14. NATO-Afghanistan Strategic Relationship
15. ANA Donation Programme
16. Ongoing Operations – Operation SHAMSHIR
17. The Role of Iran
18. The Role of the Russian Federation
3
Afghan officials refer to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. This should be reflected when referring
to the Government, particularly when addressing Afghan audiences.
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19. Afghan National Police (ANP)
20. NATO / ISAF Support to Counter Narcotics Activities
21. Comprehensive Approach / Paris Conference
22. Reconstruction and Development (R&D)
23. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)
24. Emergency Assistance
25. Detention Procedures
26. Post Operational Humanitarian Relief Fund (POHRF)
27. Hostages
28. Outsourcing of Intra-Theatre Airlift
SECTION III - KEY POLITICAL MESSAGES
29. Why is NATO in Afghanistan?
30. Legal Mandate
31. Legitimacy
32. Cooperation and Coordination as a Guiding Principle
33. What does the Afghanistan Mission mean for the Alliance?
34. NATO’s Enduring Commitment to Afghanistan
35. NATO’s Strategic Military End State
SECTION IV – BACKGROUND
36. Opposing Militant Forces (OMF) - Militants - Taleban Extremists
37. The Afghanistan Compact
38. Joint Peace Jirga (JPJ)
39. The Asia Foundation Survey – Afghanistan in 2007
40. Facts and Figures
41. Progress Since the Fall of the Taleban
SECTION I - CURRENT ISSUES
1. Characterisation of the Security Situation
As expected, the number of engagements with militants in the South and East has increased
as ANSF and ISAF are operating in greater numbers and in areas they have not been in
before.
Militants are adapting their tactics and relying increasingly on asymmetric methods such as
IEDs, terror attacks on softer targets and intimidation of innocent civilians.
The North, West and Capital regions are generally calm and have been for well over 15 months.
Occasional, though dramatic, incidents do not change this overall picture.
The security situation as of mid 2008 is characterized as follows:
Violence continues at high levels
ANSF/ISAF continue to push into regions previously controlled by the insurgents
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Change in tactics by the insurgents to attacks on more vulnerable targets and greater
use of asymmetric techniques
Increase in incidents, due in part to extremist sanctuaries across the border in Pakistan.
2. Transfer of Lead Security Responsibility
(More details – MOC Media Lines MOC(2008)ML0007)
Transfer of lead security responsibility for Kabul to ANSF was initially announced by President
Karzai at NATO Bucharest Summit in Apr 08.
Transfer of lead security responsibility will build on the achievements of Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF) and NATO/ISAF. It is evidence to the Afghan people that their
Government and security forces are increasingly credible and capable.
This is a process which is conditions-based, not time driven.
The process is driven by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The
Government is planning and executing the transfer of responsibility with NATO/ISAF
supporting their efforts.
The transfer commenced with Kabul City District.
Transfer of lead security responsibility in Kabul does not mean NATO/ISAF will depart from the
area. NATO/ISAF will continue to partner with ANSF in the outlying districts and remain ready
to reinforce ANSF in the city should it be required. It will remain partnered with Kabul City
Police and the Headquarters Security and Support Brigade of the ANA.
NATO is committed to stay as long as it takes to achieve our objectives. We are committed for
the long term to ensure a peaceful, stable and secure AFG.
3. Civilian Casualties / Human Rights
ISAF takes all possible measure to protect innocent civilians and their property.
In general:
The ISAF mission is to support the Afghan Authorities and to provide a secure and stable
environment to allow for the expansion of governance and development.
ISAF serves at the invitation of the GIRoA and for the people of Afghanistan and is mindful of
the need to maintain the confidence of the people it serves.
ISAF Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) make every effort to minimise the risk of any damage,
injury or loss of life to civilians in the course of their operations in Afghanistan. However, ISAF
reserves the right to protect its own personnel.
All ISAF soldiers operate under agreed Rules of Engagement (ROE) to minimise the risk of
civilian casualties.
COM ISAF has issued a Tactical Directive that places a priority on further reducing civilian
casualties.
An ISAF Post Operations Humanitarian Relief Fund (POHRF) has been developed to address
immediate post-operation requirements. A growing number of nations have pledged money to it.
It is a valuable instrument in the hands of COM ISAF.
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NATO/ISAF is constantly reviewing its tactics, techniques and procedures to prevent civilian
casualties and demonstrate our respect for Afghan culture without undermining the operational
effectiveness or diminishing the right to self-defence.
Under ISAF Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) any credible claim of the death of civilians
is to be immediately investigated.
ISAF has implemented rigorous investigation procedures. When NATO/ISAF does cause
civilian casualties or property damage we will accept responsibility.
To the contrary,
Militants deliberate target innocent civilians with suicide attacks and IEDs.
Militants forcefully oppose efforts to improve the life of the Afghan people and it is they
who must be held responsible for bringing violence to the Afghan people.
Militants deliberately force civilians into situations where they are either killed or are at
risk of being harmed by NATO/ISAF or coalition forces in order to undermine support
for NATO/ISAF in Afghanistan and in the International Community.
Militants tactics are to launch attacks from civilian areas, retreat to civilian areas and
use civilians as human shields. Militants want civilians caught up in the fighting,
because they think this will undermine support for NATO/ISAF in Afghanistan and in the
international community and weaken the legitimate Afghan government.
Civilian deaths caused by militants have escalated sigificantly, reflecting their increasing
use of indiscriminate tactics such as suicide bombs and IEDs. This year ISAF records
indicate that militant forces have killed more than 350 Afghans and wounded a further
800. The Human Rights Watch report Troops in Contact – Airstrikes and Civilian
Deaths in Afghanistan published in August 2008 stresses that “Taliban and other
insurgents continue to be responsible for more civilian casualties than US and NATO
forces.”
In detail:
NATO/ISAF values the life of every single person. NATO/ISAF’s strategy as well as its tactics
reflects this fundamental difference with the militants.
That is why NATO/ISAF has its procedures under constant review; that is why NATO/ISAF
undertakes rigorous and constant investigations to learn the right lessons; that is why
NATO/ISAF will work even more closely with the Afghans, whom they are there to defend.
Constant review of tactics, techniques and procedures in the light of the opponent’s conduct is
key to success.
For his part SACEUR has mandated to:
produce enhanced and timely After Action Reviews to identify lessons learned
establish a stronger system of reporting from investigations when deemed necessary
look for additional opportunities to involve Afghan official and other partners, including
UNAMA in investigations
To minimise the risk of harming civilians and reduce behaviour which offends Afghans
COMISAF has revised his Tactical Directive:
To partner with ANSF in all ISAF operations.
To make no uninvited entry into an Afghan house, mosque, historical or religious site
unless there is a clear and identified danger.
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To demonstrate respect and consideration for Afghans, their culture, their customs, and
Islam. To avoid insults, offensive gestures, unnecessary pointing of weapons, and
reckless driving.
To demonstrate proportionality, restraint, and utmost discrimination in the use of
firepower -- making greatest possible use of precision systems.
When taking fire from an Afghan house, on-scene commanders must satisfy
themselves that every effort has been made to confirm that the Afghan facility does not
shelter innocent civilians.
To set the conditions to minimize the use of deadly force in Escalation of Force
procedures against civilians through tactics, techniques, procedures and training.
To acknowledge civilian casualties immediately and transparently investigate
allegations rapidly.
To establish a transparent methodology of civilian casualty reporting COM ISAF:
established a civilian casualties tracking cell monitoring incidents
systemized recording of allegations as well as resulting rebuttals and admissions
developed a two-tiered system of checking the validity of the allegation and conducting
the actual investigation if the allegation was substantiated
enhanced battle-damage assessments at Regional Command level
defined modalities for improved ISAF HQ interaction with UNAMA on casualty reporting,
in relation to the existing Regional Command – UNAMA interaction.
ISAF is aware of differing assessments on the number of civilian casualties from different
stakeholders. We have had constructive meetings with UNAMA with an aim to reconcile
differing methodologies and set up firmer basis for cooperation.
4. Use of Airpower
Airpower in Afghanistan is used:
in support of ground forces, with specific need and in specific situations
on positively identified (P-I-D) enemy firing positions
upon request and approval by the ground commander.
Airpower is vital to the defence of Afghanistan because:
it provides speed, maneuverability and range
the terrain impedes maneuver of troops and supplies
the remoteness of locations hampers the use of ground forces
it provides the most precise power projection available.
Airpower is employed by ISAF under the strictest possible restrictions—if there is any reason to
believe there are civilians present a strike will not occur.
5. NATO Support to the Afghan National Army (ANA)
The provision of direct support to the ANA is one of NATO/ISAF’s key military tasks.
NATO/ISAF has now fought alongside the ANA and is committed to providing continued direct
support to it, through mentoring, training and equipment support.
Building an effective ANA is critical to building a self-sustaining Afghanistan.
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The US is the G8 lead nation for the development of the ANA and very significant progress has
been made; further work is required to strengthen ANA mobility, combat support and combat
service support.
NATO’s involvement with the ANA focuses more on its employment than its manning, initial
training and sustenance. NATO assists the GIRoA to bring the ANA up to operating capability
through the provision of Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT).
OMLTs provide a bridge from the collective training received in the Kabul Military Training
Centre to field training. This training across the full spectrum of ANA unit activities includes
ANA garrison functions and operational deployments. OMLTs deploy on operations in an
advisory role.
OMLTs provide the critically important conduit for liaison and command and control between
ANA units and nearby ISAF/Coalition forces, while providing the ANA with essential combat
enablers.
As of September 2008, NATO has fielded 36 OMLTs, a shortfall of 23 from the 59 currently
required. The Alliance is working to increase this number significantly to accommodate the
proposed increases in the ANA. (These numbers do not reflect the non-ISAF U.S.
commitments)
The Afghan National Army is truly a “national” institution representing the entire country.
The ANA is growing in strength and capability every day. As of August 2008, the ANA is
manned at over 66,000 (83%) personnel, many of whom are conducting operations side by
side with ISAF forces.
For the remainder of 2008, it is planned to increase the monthly training output from
approximately 2,000 to 4,000. The authorized strength of the ANA has been increased to
approximately 70,000 in 2008, with additional increases planned to 80,000 by 2009, and
122,000 by 2013.
The Afghan MoD has proposed expanding the ANA to 122,000 by 2013. This expansion will
require increases in the ISAF OMLT commitment, forecasts and plans of which are currently
under development.
Successes in combat operations in which the ANA participated in a leading role encompass all
five ANA Corps. As of September 2008, ANA is involved in over 70% of all ISAF operations
and has led the planning and execution of 60% of the 200+ planned operations this year.
Additional OMLT requirements are being reviewed to address the planned increase of the ANA
to 122,000.
The establishment of an ANA Air Corps (ANAAC) has further contributed to the overall
capability of the ANA.
Since January 2008, ANAAC Cargo lift has increased from 9,000 Kg to 37,450 Kg in July.
Sorties have increased from 107 total FW/RW to 695 in July, while passenger lift increased
from 2,368 to 8,513 in the same period.
In 2008, four Mi-17s, six Mi-35s, and 2 An-32s are being delivered, and the ANAAC have
conducted their first fixed-wing and point-of-injury MEDEVAC flights.
ANA Trust Fund
Established to cover the transportation and installation cost of the equipment donations, the
purchase of equipment, the purchase of services for engineering and construction projects,
and in/out-of-country training.
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Contributions as of 5 Sep 08
Donated Used Remaining
Total 7,118,593 Euro 2,338,299 Euro 4,780,296 Euro balance
Transportation 1,338,299 Euro 1,338,299 Euro 0*
Purchase of Equipment 5,104,295 Euro 1,000,000 Euro 4,104,295 Euro
100,000 Euro
Training 100,000 Euro
Infrastr. & Engineering 576,000 Euro 576,000 Euro
The zero transportation balance is critical because none of the donations can be shipped to
Afghanistan. For example, the Czech Republic has graciously donated six transport
helicopters. There is no funding available to ship these to the ANA.
6. Kajaki Dam Project
In a unique joint operation, the Afghan National Security Forces and ISAF successfully delivered a
new turbine to Kajaki Dam in Helmand province. The project, supported by the GIRoA, is one part
of the international community’s effort towards redevelopment in the southern region. The result
will be a much needed increase in capacity to generate electrical power.
7. ISAF support to Voter Registration and Elections
Presidential and Provincial Council elections are scheduled for mid-August 2009, with
parliamentary elections set for mid-September 2010.
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan with the Independent Electoral
Commission (IEC) is planning for the elections in conjunction with the Afghan National
Security Forces as the leading security force. ISAF is supporting, within means and
capabilities, ANSF planning, coordinating and executing security for the voter registration
process during the period of October 2008 to February 2009 timeframe. The basic concept
is that ISAF will provide third-line security, backing up the Afghan National Police and Army
in supporting this Afghan-led process. A security plan was signed by the chairman of the
Afghan Independent Election Commission along with representatives from the MoI, MoD,
and ISAF on 24 Aug 08.
8. AWACS capability in support of ISAF
The provision of the AWACS capability for the ISAF mission was requested by COM ISAF.
SACEUR has supported this request and recommended the deployment of NATO AWACS
in support of ISAF.
There is a requirement to help control the increasing amount of air traffic there and ensure
flight safety for both military and civilian aircraft. The NATO AWACS is one possible means
of providing such a capability.
NAC approval is required for the deployment of AWACS outside of NATO territory. NATO’s
political authorities will consider this potential employment of AWACS for ISAF once a
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consolidated military advice from the Military Committee is received. The process is likely to
take several weeks.
9. The Role of Pakistan
‘Increased cooperation and engagement with Afghanistan’s neighbours, especially Pakistan’ is
one of the four guiding principles laid down in the strategic vision statement for the ISAF
mission as agreed at the Bucharest Summit by NATO Heads of State and/or Government in
April 2008.
NATO/ISAF recognizes the desire of the democratically-elected Government of Pakistan to
come to negotiated agreements with militants. NATO/ISAF is concerned, however, that any
agreements should not contribute to a deterioration of security inside Afghanistan.
NATO/ISAF fully respects the sovereignty of Pakistan. NATO/ISAF has every right, however,
to address issues which might diminish security in Afghanistan, and put its military and civilian
personnel at risk.
Besides its political contacts with Pakistan, NATO continues to engage in military to military
contacts in the framework of the Tripartite Commission, in which ISAF, Afghanistan and
Pakistan are represented. NATO/ISAF is currently enhancing its military liaison presence in
Pakistan to strengthen communication and coordination. Whatever happens in Pakistan,
efforts to curtail cross-border support to insurgents must continue.
Pakistan also plays an important role in the logistics support of the ISAF mission. Land lines of
communication through Pakistan are used extensively by ISAF nations, and NATO is working
with the Pakistani authorities to finalize a Transit Agreement.
Afghanistan and Pakistan are confronted by a common enemy that does not respect the
border. The cross-border movement of this enemy is a particular concern that makes
constructive engagement between Afghanistan, Pakistan and ISAF essential.
President Karzai and President Zardari have vowed to work together towards durable peace.
MOFA Spanta and MOFA Qureshi announced an agreement to hold joint mini jirga in early
October in Islamabad.
Military coordination is primarily pursued through the Tripartite Commission, comprising
senior military representatives from Pakistan, Afghanistan and NATO/ISAF.
In August COMISAF, GEN Bismullah Khan (ANA CSA), GEN Kayani (PAK CSA) held the first
Tripartite meeting since Nov 2007 in Bagram, Afghanistan and agreed to continue to meet.
Its four main areas of cooperation are intelligence sharing, border security, counter IED and
information operations initiatives. Practical joint coordination measures and procedures have
been added as the primary focus.
Progress is being made in initiating joint border patrols and in improving cooperation at the
tactical level.
A Tripartite Joint Intelligence Operations Centre (T-JIOC), located within HQ ISAF in Kabul,
has been established and staffed jointly by officers from the ANA, Pakistan Army and ISAF.
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The first joint border coordination centre (BCC) was inaugurated in the Torkham (Khyber) area
on 29 March 2008. The next two BCCs are being constructed at Lwara Pass in Paktika and
Nawa Pass in Kunar (TBC this calendar year).
NATO and the Allies are aware of the volatile security situation in Pakistan’s Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) Baluchistan and Northwest Frontier Province. The number of
cross border incursions from Pakistan to Afghanistan continues to be monitored.
Only if pressed: ISAF forces are frequently fired at from inside Pakistan, very close to the
border. In some cases defensive fire is required, against specific threats. Wherever possible,
such fire is pre-coordinated with the Pakistani military.
NATO calls on Afghanistan’s neighbours to act resolutely in support of the Afghan
Government’s efforts to build a stable Afghanistan with secure borders.
NATO looks forward to deepening the engagement with Afghanistan’s neighbours, particularly
Pakistan.
NATO/ISAF is currently enhancing its liaison arrangements in Pakistan to strengthen
coordination and communication with Pakistan’s military authorities.
NATO and the Pakistani Government are continuing their discussions on the development of a
transit agreement which will formalize arrangements whereby Allies and other nations
participating in ISAF to transport equipment to the ISAF theatre through Pakistan’s territory.
10. Launch of Operation TOLO
OP TOLO will begin on 1 November 2008 and will consolidate and build on the achievements of
OP SHAMSHIR. It is an ISAF/ANSF framework operation under which focused security operations
will be conducted in conjunction with wider R&D, as well as governance activities. ISAF will
operate in partnership with the ANSF and International Community to synchronise efforts across
all lines of operation.
During OP TOLO, ISAF/ANSF operations will aim at isolating/separating the insurgents
from AFG popular support. It also aims to degrade insurgent capability and increase
support to GIRoA, ANSF and ISAF among the AFG population.
OP TOLO aims at expanding GIRoA governance. During OP TOLO, the GIRoA will further
implement progressive sub-national governance to support coordinated and focused
reconstruction efforts.
ISAF will build ANSF capacity and capability by developing flexible and continuous planning
cycles that take advantage of the ANSF involvement in the planning and execution of
focused operations. This will promote continued close partnership with the ANA to develop
their ability to plan and lead independent counter insurgency operations.
ISAF support to develop the ANP will enable it to mature into a capable and credible force
able to exercise responsibility for local and border security. This is essential to enabling
GIRoA and international community support for coordinated and focused R&D. ISAF will
continue to complement and support ANP in selected areas within our focused operations.
11. US Command and Control (C2) arrangements
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We/NATO/ISAF have noted the US decision to appoint GEN McKiernan as Commander, US
Forces Afghanistan.
We welcome this initiative which will enhance coordination between international military
forces in Afghanistan and thus enable us to work more closely and effectively in support of
the ANSF.
This decision neither changes the ISAF mandate, nor merges the ISAF mission with the US-
led Operation Enduring Freedom. As US authorities have stated, OEF will continue to
conduct counter-terrorism (CT) and detention operations under a separate mandate. The
change of US C2 arrangements do not bring CT and detention operations under GEN
McKiernan or ISAF.
This amendment to the command relationships will enable the ANA operational mentoring
element of the ISAF mission and the OEF-led ANA training mission under Combined
Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) to work even more closely and
effectively. This will be increasingly important as the ANA grows in size and capacity.
In addition, US forces under OEF regularly provide support to ANSF and ISAF forces as
theyconduct security operations across the country. This decision will enable GEN
McKiernan to coordinate and direct all these forces more effectively.
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SECTION II – ENDURING ISSUES
12. NATO/ISAF Mission
In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, NATO/ISAF’s mission is
to help create a secure and stable environment for the people of Afghanistan.
NATO’s strategic objectives are the extension of government authority across Afghanistan; the
development of the Afghan Government structures necessary to maintain security across the
country without the assistance of international forces; the establishment of a stable and secure
environment in which sustainable R&D has taken hold; and the promotion by the Afghan
Government of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
The NATO-led ISAF mission is to assist the GIRoA in the establishment and maintenance of a
secure and stable environment, with full engagement of ANSF, in order to extend government
authority and influence, thereby facilitating Afghanistan’s reconstruction and stability.
ISAF shall work in conjunction with the international community in an integrated approach to
advance the three pillars of security, governance, and development as specified in the Afghan
National Development Strategy (ANDS). ISAF will lead the security effort and will support the
governance and development efforts.
To carry out this mission, ISAF will conduct security and stability operations in coordination with
Afghan security forces and will provide support to the Government and International
Community in Security Sector Reform, including mentoring, training and operational support to
the Afghan National Army.
NATO/ISAF, within its means and capabilities, will assist the Afghan National Police and
provide support to the Afghan Authorities with their National Drug Control Strategy, as well as
security assistance to judicial reform initiatives. This will be done in close coordination and
consultation with the EU and the respective G8 Partner Nations, mainly the US and Germany
as key partner nations in the Police Sector Reform.
NATO/ISAF’s Rules of Engagement are robust and entirely appropriate for the challenges
faced.
NATO has the strategy and forces to succeed over time.
If asked: However, we could achieve the mission much faster and more efficiently with more.
To that end we are constantly re-assessing the capabilities required to achieve the political
goal and to mitigate any shortfalls.
13. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
The US-led Coalition continues to operate under OEF authorities. There are three primary
areas of operation which include training and equipping of the Afghan National Army and
Afghan National Police, contributing to Afghanistan’s R&D, and conducting counter-terrorism
operations. OEF operates under a separate mandate to that of ISAF.
ISAF and OEF forces maintain close coordination and deconfliction to maintain the distinction
and mutual support between the two missions.
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14. NATO - Afghanistan Strategic Relationship
NATO has developed a programme of cooperation with Afghanistan, aimed at building a
partnership-type cooperation to complement ISAF’s operational role. This programme is yet
further evidence of NATO’s enduring commitment to Afghanistan.
The Joint NATO-Afghanistan Declaration was signed on 6 Sept 2006 by NATO Secretary
General and President Karzai in Kabul.
The programme works under the guiding principle of Afghan ownership. It will be closely
coordinated with other relevant international actors.
The cooperation programme focuses on defence reform, including but not limited to,
democratic control of the armed forces, defence planning and interoperability. NATO now has
considerable experience to share with Afghanistan in this field.
15. ANA Donation Programme (as of August 2008)
NATO equipment donations programme in support of the ANA started in summer 2006 building
on previous achievements on bilateral basis.
NATO works in support of the G8 lead nation (USA) sponsoring the overall ANA training and
equipping programme through Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-
A).
SHAPE coordinates equipment donations on behalf of ISAF contributing nations.
Equipment donations completed:
Bulgaria mortars and ammunition
Canada small arms, ammunition and equipment
Czech Republic helicopters
Estonia small arms and ammunition
Finland field telephones and generators
Germany blankets, clothing and equipment
Hungary small arms and ammunition
Lithuania ammunition
Luxemburg individual body armour and helmets
Montenegro small arms and ammunition
Slovenia small arms, mortars and ammunition
Switzerland fire trucks, spares and training
Turkey howitzers and ammunition, clothing equipment and military academy
supplies
Further offers of equipment are under consideration by: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, France, Greece, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Romania, United Kingdom.
16. Ongoing Operations – Operation SHAMSHIR
ISAF will sustain its operations over the coming months. With the forces available now, and
arriving in theatre in future months, ISAF will build upon its previous successes. Although the
insurgents remain a tactical threat in the South and the East, with continued NATO/ISAF and
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ANSF engagement they do not pose an overall threat to the country.
Operation Shamshir (or ‘Longsword’) is the name given to the overarching operational
framework for ISAF and ANSF operations from March 2008 onward.
Op Shamshir is the follow-on framework operation to operations Now Ruz and Pamir.
The focus of Op Shamshir is to maintain pressure on the militants in order to interrupt their
ability to re-arm, re-equip and re-group during the upcoming period.
Op Shamshir will support the further expansion of GIRoA governance and further separate
the militants from the population.
Op Shamshir is an ISAF-ANSF framework operation under which focused security
operations will be conducted in conjunction with wider R&D, as well as governance
activities.
Op Shamshir, like Ops Now Ruz and Pamir before, will allow NATO/ISAF to continue to
focus on the provision of security in order to permit reconstruction and development to take
place..
Op Shamshir is a combined ISAF-ANSF operation. The Afghan Ministry of Defence was
fully involved in its planning and will participate throughout the conduct of the operation.
17. The Role of Iran
The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan maintain diplomatic
relations. Both the GIRoA and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran repeatedly
indicated that they will pursue the development of stable and trustful relations.
Weapons with Iranian markings have been intercepted on Afghan territory.
NATO/ISAF has no direct evidence of Iranian government involvement.
NATO/ISAF is monitoring the situation.
18. The Role of the Russian Federation
ISAF-related United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386 encourages
“neighbouring States and other Member States to provide to ISAF such necessary assistance
as may be requested, including the provision of over flight clearances and transit”.
Discussions between NATO and the Russian Federation are taking place in the framework
of UNSCR 1386 and subsequent resolutions, and under the umbrella of the NATO-RUSSIA
Council (NRC).
The main elements of these discussions are arrangements for air and land transit of ISAF-
bound (not just NATO) non-lethal military equipment (not personnel) through the Russian
Federation in support of the ISAF mission, as well as further cooperation to train police and
counter-narcotics officers from Afghanistan and Central Asia in Russia and Central Asia.
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Discussions are still ongoing and have not been affected by the state of NATO-Russia
relationship. Both NATO and the Russian Federation have an interest in a stable and secure
Afghanistan.
While Russia’s offer was formalized at the Bucharest Summit in April 08, NATO or ISAF
contributors have not yet had a possibility to avail themselves of it, given the need for similar
arrangements to be in place with Central Asian partners which are also on the Northern
route to AFG.NATO continues its consultation with the transit states concerned (Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan).
NOTE:
Any talk of stationing or deploying Russian military assets in Afghanistan is out of the
question and has never been the subject of any considerations.
Nothing will take place on the territory of Afghanistan that has not been discussed with and
agreed by GIRoA.
19. Afghan National Police (ANP)
Police reform is one of the most critical issues for Afghanistan’s security and stability and even
greater efforts are needed in this vital area. Law enforcement is a supporting task for ISAF.
The overall development of the ANP continues to lag behind that of the ANA although it is
trending upwards. The current staffing plan of the MoI allows for 82,000 ANP.
The Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) was introduced in some high risk provinces as a
temporary structure and extended until 1 October 2008 to be absorbed as appropriate in the
ANP after that time, see also para 14.
The high number of ANP casualties – in 2007 more than 1,000 ANP were killed in action and
1,400 wounded (source: Spokesperson AFG MoI) - underlines the urgent need for better
training, equipment and tactical employment.
ANP presence and policing performance need to be strengthened and the infrastructure by
which pay and benefits are administered must be improved.
To better coordinate the efforts of the main actors in the field of police reform, the Combined
International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) was formed. The board consists of
representatives of the Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A),
EUPOL, UNAMA and the Afghan Ministry of the Interior. It meets once a month under the
chairmanship of the Afghan Minister of Interior.
CSTC-A launched the initiative of Focused District Development (FDD) whose main
objective is to create secure areas and to build on them. The police corps of selected districts
is now undergoing training in Regional Training Centres.
Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), trained by US International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Agency (INL) and Germany, replaces the regular police in selected districts on a
temporary basis until they complete their training and return with full equipment.
ANCOP, a ‘gendarmerie’ type police force, has an authorised strength of 5,365 personnel. 30%
have been assigned so far. Eight urban battalions and 11 patrol battalions will be fielded.
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20. NATO/ISAF Support to Counter Narcotics Activities
Counter Narcotics is a law enforcement matter for the Afghan authorities. NATO/ISAF supports
the Government’s National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS).
The security threats presented by the narco-economy, including links between the insurgents
and the drugs trade, are evident. Consequently, NATO/ISAF is working to maximize its support
to counter narcotics operations in accordance with the provisions of the ROE and the OpPlan.
For details see MOC(2007)ML0006 of 28 August 2007 Media Lines on Counter-Narcotics
(NATO UNCLASSIFIED, on e-prime WG.7).
The GIRoA has the lead on Counter-Narcotics, supported by the G8 lead nation UK.
The Afghan National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) defines four priorities: targeting the
trafficker; providing alternative rural livelihoods; reducing demand and developing state
institutions.
NATO/ISAF provides assistance to the Afghan authorities’ counter narcotics operations
through training, intelligence and logistics, and in-extremis support, as appropriate. NATO/ISAF
also helps the Afghan government to explain its counter narcotics policy to its people. If
necessary for counter narcotics officials under attack, military support is possible if they are in
imminent danger.
ISAF support of Afghan Government counter narcotics programmes includes:
sharing of counter narcotics information through the Intelligence Fusion Cell, which
brings ISAF together with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Afghan authorities and
other key international community actors;
developing command and control procedures for effective liaison, co-ordination and
deconfliction with the Afghan National Security Forces and the OEF Coalition;
supporting the Government’s counter narcotics information campaign with a range of
activities, including television and radio advertisements;
training Afghan national security forces;
providing emergency support, such as medical evacuation, to Afghan army forces
conducting counter-narcotics operations;
providing logistical support to international community actors, such as the international
counter-narcotics agencies, as well as Afghan counter-narcotics personnel and forces.
NATO is committed to fully implement its counter narcotics tasks as outlined in the current
ISAF mandate.
The UNDOC reported in August that the number of poppy free provinces had increased from
13 in 2007 to 18 (out of 34). The number of poppy-free provinces has increased for the second
year running. Opium cultivation has fallen by 19% nationwide, to its lowest level since 2006.
Counter narcotics experience in other countries shows that it takes a sustained commitment for
many years to minimise narcotics production. There is no simple answer to how long the
Afghan counter narcotics battle will last.
21. Comprehensive Approach / Paris Conference
Operational experience, particularly in Afghanistan and Kosovo, demonstrates that today’s
challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international community, involving a wide
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spectrum of civil and military instruments, while fully respecting mandates, autonomy and
decisions of all actors.
To support a wider comprehensive approach the Alliance is situating its planning and
operations in a wider framework, recognizing that the provision of security is linked to the
pursuit of good governance and reconstruction and development.
What is required now is to ensure a greater degree of effective coordination within NATO at all
levels, and better co-operation with other actors in order to complement and mutually reinforce
each other’s efforts to achieve common goals.
Against this background, NATO Heads of State and Government at the 2006 Riga Summit and
re-affirmed at the Bucharest Summit called for the development of pragmatic proposals to
improve the coherent application of NATO’s own crisis management instruments, as well as
practical co-operation at all levels with partners, the UN and other relevant International
Organizations (IO), Non Governmental Organizations (NGO), and local actors in the planning
and conduct of ongoing and future operations, wherever appropriate.
The Paris Conference of 12 June 2008 demonstrated the solid and long-term commitment to
Afghanistan of the International Community. The Afghan National Development Strategy
(ANDS) embodies the priorities that the Afghans set for themselves to further develop their
country in the next five years. This achievement by the Afghans and for the Afghans is a sound
example of progress since 2001. It provides a roadmap to fulfilling the vision of the Afghanistan
Compact, which remains the basis for our efforts.
22. Reconstruction and Development (R&D)
NATO/ISAF role is to create the security conditions conducive to the R&D efforts of GIRoA,
donors and development actors. NATO/ISAF’s own R&D efforts are synchronised to support
short-term needs and the longer-term strategies and programmes of the GIRoA.
NATO/ISAF works with key international players in the development community to facilitate
R&D priorities identified by the Afghans themselves. This is done under the auspices of the
Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and the National Solidarity Programme (NSP)
towards the objectives laid down in the Afghanistan Compact.
In exceptional circumstances where other elements of the civilian aid community are unable to
provide assistance because of security or logistics constraints, NATO/ISAF may carry out, or
commission work, for the benefit of the Afghan people within means and capabilities of
assigned forces. In such cases the military forces will be assisted by their own Development
Advisers, embedded within PRTs, RCs and HQ ISAF and, security and sensitivity concerns
allowing, by members of the development community themselves.
Every effort is made to ensure there is no unnecessary duplication of effort, that initiatives are
in line with GIRoA priorities, that projects respond to the population’s needs, are sustainable in
the longer term and do not have an adverse effect on the work of other development
organisations.
"There can be no government without an army // no army without money // no money without
prosperity // and no prosperity without Justice and good Administration" (This quotation has
been taken from the preamble of the ANDS).
Number of ongoing projects by ANDS sectors are:
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ANDS SECTORS PRT NON-PRT
Agriculture and Rural
Development 723 8,750
Education 2,191 7,594
Good Governance 922 1,700
Health 756 2,159
Infrastructure and Natural
Resources 2,588 24,842
Private Sector Development 298 3,230
Security 794 973
Social Protection 1,596 1,436
Grand Total 9,868 50,684
23. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
PRTs are a key feature of the NATO/ISAF operation.
PRTs are a mix of civilian and military personnel whose main purpose is to extend the reach of
the GIRoA by helping to facilitate GIRoA Ministries, IOs and NGOs to carry out their assistance
programmes to the civilian population.
A key principle of PRT operations is the need to identify Afghan stakeholders, understand local
dynamics, encourage local ownership and seek to build sustainable Afghan capacities by
working through and with Afghan authorities.
The military component focuses on building security sector capacity and increasing stability.
The civilian component leads on political, economic, humanitarian and social aspects of the
PRTs work, supporting the GIRoA’s national development priorities.
There is not a “one size fits all” PRT: they each reflect the prevailing regional circumstances
and their lead nation’s chosen approach.
NATO/ISAF is sensitive to the need to distinguish between military and civilian activities, to
avoid putting civilian personnel and partners at greater risk. In volatile areas, PRTs are aware
of the risks development actors working in local communities might be exposed to if they are
too closely associated with military forces; therefore, the PRTs endeavour to maintain a
distance between parties.
24. Emergency Assistance
Emergency assistance is that which is life saving and addresses urgent and life threatening
humanitarian needs.
ISAF may be requested to assist with relief supplies. The use of military assets is a last
resort.
ISAF may be called upon to deliver three types of assistance:
Direct - face-to-face distribution of relief goods, providing first aid, transporting
victims etc.
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Indirect – transporting relief goods, building camps and shelters, providing water
sources etc.
Infrastructure – repairing infrastructure
When undertaking any relief supplies, ISAF will coordinate closely with GIRoA authorities
and UNAMA to ensure any relief conforms to a provincial needs assessment. Construction
will, to the maximum extent possible, conform to the Provincial Development Plan.
Assistance following national disasters will be provided in close coordination with the Afghan
Natural Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA).
ISAF SOP for emergency response shows military forces will only respond for in extremis
support and acknowledges there are only two requesters for emergency support – the
National Emergency Response Commission (NERC) and the National Emergency
Operations Centre (NEOC).
When UNAMA and GIRoA have a reduced or limited provincial presence, PRTs are to
coordinate with the closest UNAMA office and be prepared to play a more substantial role in
supporting disaster management teams.
Relief supplies:
Since January 2008, more than 90 tons of relief supplies have been delivered.
Efforts were coordinated by ISAF forces, ANSF, UNAMA and respective NGOs all
over the country.
In addition, ISAF and ANSF assistance continues through the Medical Civilian Action
Programme (MEDCAP).
Veterinary assistance operations are also conducted jointly by ISAF and ANSF to
protect lifestock through the harsh weather conditions.
25. Detention Procedures
ISAF has effective, transparent and appropriate detention procedures. They reflect the
requirements of international law and respect the sovereign responsibilities of Afghanistan.
According to NATO procedures ISAF troop contributing nations (TCN) hand over any detainee,
within 96 hours, to the appropriate Afghan authorities. Key points are:
ISAF procedures meet appropriate international standards.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been consulted extensively in
both the formulation and implementation of ISAF Detention Procedures (SOP 362) and is
satisfied with this policy.
The ICRC is informed of all detainees taken by ISAF TCN, and is informed if they are
handed over to the Afghan Authorities (i.e. there are no “secret” detainees).
Appropriate humanitarian standards are always applied; wounded are treated and detainees
are evacuated away from combat zones as soon as is practicable.
ISAF detention procedures allow, under exceptional circumstances, for transfers to be extended
beyond 96 hours, for medical or logistical reasons. Consistent with international law, detainees
should also not be transferred under any circumstances in which there is a risk that they may be
subjected to torture or other forms of ill treatment.
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Some TCNs to ISAF have established Memoranda of Understanding with the GIRoA outlining
more specific conditions under which they will hand over detainees to the Afghan authorities.
NATO does not have such an arrangement and there are no plans to establish one.
26. Post Operational Humanitarian Relief Fund (POHRF)
NOTE: The term “compensation” is inappropriate and should not be used because it brings with
it legal implications that do not apply. ISAF makes every effort to minimise the risk of any
damage, injury or loss of life to civilians in the course of its operations in Afghanistan.
NATO/ISAF deeply regrets the death or injury of any innocent civilian as a result of its
operations.
As a matter of policy, NATO/ISAF does not compensate for damage or loss occurring during
operations. Any claims concerning operational damage and losses are referred by ISAF to the
TCN concerned for proper handling, in accordance with their individual national law, policy and
procedures.
NATO/ISAF does make significant efforts to facilitate speedy R&D in those areas affected by
ISAF operations.
The ISAF POHRF has been established to provide rapid humanitarian assistance such as the
supply of food, water and shelter, or the repair of buildings or key infrastructure, immediately
following sizable ISAF military operations.
The basic guiding principle is for this humanitarian assistance to remain: "as civilian as
possible, as military as necessary," in line with the UN "Oslo Guidelines" (revised) on
humanitarian assistance. Specifically:
The Fund consists entirely of voluntary donations and is established under the auspices
of COMISAF, who is responsible for its sound financial management. NATO’s North
Atlantic Council, through the Senior Civilian Representative (SCR), is regularly updated
on the implementation of the Fund.
The Fund may be used only to finance rapid humanitarian assistance to the population
directly affected by a military operation. Assistance should include, but not be limited to:
food, water, shelter, essential medicines and essential repairs. No longer term
reconstruction activities should be undertaken, but neither should immediate relief
undermine longer term engagement.
The implementation of on-going humanitarian measures should be transferred to
civilian actors as soon as circumstances allow. The decision for this transfer is taken by
COMISAF in consultation with the Senior Civilian Representative.
Contributions as at 2 October 2008:
Contributions
Australia € 315,375
Bulgaria € 170,000
Czech Republic € 370,640
Estonia € 124,895
Finland € 100,000
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Iceland € 100,000
Lithuania € 63,763
Netherlands € 300,000
USA € 1,300,000
TOTAL € 2,844,673
Second Quarter 2008 Disbursements
Regional Command South: One project worth € 32,215 was funded for building material,
hired labour and assistance items.
Regional Command West: Four projects worth € 205,000 for village kits, hygiene kits,
first aid kits, short term food supplies, crop replacement and refurbishment of wells
damaged by ISAF operations as well as new wells for Afghans forced to leave their land.
Regional Command North: Two projects worth € 100,000 for small infrastructure damage
and emergency assistance to affected locals.
Total Disbursements Approved 1st Quarter 2008: € 407,205
Total Disbursements Approved Since Inception: € 1,738,689
27. Hostages
Any ISAF troop contributing nation whose citizen is kidnapped faces an extremely difficult
situation.
The actions of one nation can have implications for other countries. This should be taken into
account.
The exchange of prisoners for hostages can be an incentive for criminals and extremists to
take more hostages.
Further discussion on this issue will take place among Allies.
28. Outsourcing of Intra-Theatre Airlift
NATO outsourced airlift capability in support of the ISAF mission in early 2008. Contracted
aircraft, which include helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, are used to transport supplies and
equipment exclusively.
Outsourcing routine logistics sustainment tasks frees military aviation assets to focus on
combat manoeuvre missions.
The decision to outsource is an opportunity to put in place a steady source of airlift that is
capable of meeting the needs of the mission.
It is nothing unusual in military operations to outsource support when it is advantageous to
do so. It is important to bear in mind the great demands placed on our countries’ forces,
and not only in the NATO framework. Missions carried out by individual nations, the United
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Nations and/or the European Union involve calling on nations’ assets, both manpower and
equipment.
NOTE TO PAO: Media queries on the contract are to be directed to JFC-B PAO.
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SECTION III – KEY POLITICAL MESSAGES
29. Why is NATO in Afghanistan?
NATO’s presence in Afghanistan is in the best interests of the Afghan people, it is in the interest of
our own peoples, and it is the right thing to do.
The security of NATO member states does not start at their borders.
Terrorism and the drugs trade do not recognise territorial boundaries.
As a failed state under the Taleban, Afghanistan exported terrorism, instability and crime to its
neighbours and to the rest of the world.
Today, NATO and the wider International Community stand by the democratically elected
GIRoA and the people of Afghanistan to prevent this happening again.
30. Legal Mandate
ISAF is mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Ten UN Security Council Resolutions
– 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1659, 1707, 1776 and 1833 – relate to ISAF.
The ISAF mission was created in accordance with the Bonn Conference of December 2001
and its tasks are detailed in a Military Technical Agreement of January 2002 between the ISAF
Commander and the Afghan Transitional Authority.
ISAF was initially led by lead nations: the UK, followed by Turkey and the joint lead of Germany
and the Netherlands.
In August 2003, upon request of the UN and GIRoA, NATO took responsibility for ISAF.
31. Legitimacy
NATO is in Afghanistan at the express wish of the democratically elected GIRoA and is widely
supported by the Afghan population.
NATO/ISAF is in Afghanistan to support the legitimate Afghan authorities.
As demonstrated in all opinion polls, there is strong support from the Afghan people for
NATO/ISAF.
32. Cooperation and Coordination as Guiding Principles
NATO plays a supporting role to the sovereign GIRoA. Under its UN mandate, NATOISAF
works in close coordination with other international partners, including the United Nations
Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), the G8 lead nations, the World Bank, the
European Union and the development community to facilitate and foster the implementation of
the Afghanistan Compact.
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ISAF communicates and coordinates with the ANA on a daily basis at multiple levels of
command, from Ministry-level down to within individual Kandaks (battalions).
NATO/ISAF and the SCR play a full role in the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
(JCMB). Co-chaired by the president’s chief economic adivisor and the UN’s SRSG, this body
comprises the key GIRoA and International Community actors charged with implementing the
Afghanistan Compact. It has a number of functional working groups, which report regularly to
the full JCMB.
The Policy Action Group (PAG) was created in July 2006 at President Karzai’s behest to focus
Afghan and international effort on fostering improved security within the responsibility of
Regional Command (South). The PAG is Afghan-led, is supported by NATO/ISAF, UNAMA,
World Bank, EU and G8 lead nations and meets bi-weekly. It has 4 working groups on security,
intelligence, strategic communications and R&D.
The Paris Conference of 12 June 2008 reaffirmed the international efforts to implement the
Afghanistan Compact.
33. What does the Afghanistan Mission mean for the Alliance?
NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan represents one of its toughest challenges. Currently, it is
the Alliance’s single most important issue and there is a complete determination to succeed.
NATO fully recognises that threats to our security are no longer limited to opposing state
armies or marked by geographic boundaries. NATO will meet all security challenges with
determination.
NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan is proof-positive of its transformation from a static, Cold-
War orientation to an organisation capable of dynamic and flexible response and geared to
meet the asymmetric challenges to the Allies and their shared values.
The participation of all 26 Allies in the NATO/ISAF mission with troops on the ground clearly
demonstrates the cohesion of the Alliance. Ten partner nations (ALB, AUT, AZE, CRO, FIN,
FYROM, GEO, IRL, SWE, UKR) and three contact nations (AUS, NZL, SGP) and two ICI
countries (JOR, UAE) also contribute forces to the operation, bringing ISAF troop numbers in
Afghanistan to roughly 50,700.
34. NATO’s Enduring Commitment to Afghanistan
NATO and its partners in ISAF have the strategic patience and commitment necessary to see
the mission in Afghanistan through to successful completion. The Afghan people can rely on
NATO/ISAF to stay the course.
Afghanistan has suffered almost three decades of war, years of drought, and it continues to
face challenges from enemies who seek to drag the country away from a peaceful, healthier
and more prosperous future.
Progress is steady, but there remains a long way to go.
Roughly 50,700 service personnel from 41 countries are committed to the ISAF mission, which
has steadily expanded to cover the whole country, including the most challenging areas.
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NATO established the post of a Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) to further the Alliance’s
political engagement in Afghanistan. The SCR is not in the military chain of command but
he/she has a close partnership with COM ISAF to maintain synergy between NATO’s military
and civilian efforts.
The NATO-Afghanistan Declaration, signed in Kabul on 6 Sept 06, aims at building partnership
and cooperation with Afghanistan to support and complement NATO/ISAF’s operational role.
This is indicative of NATO’s enduring commitment to Afghanistan.
35. Strategic Military End State
NOTE: Any decision on the end date/end state will be taken by the respective national and/or
Alliance political committee. Under no circumstances should the mission end-date be a topic
for speculation in public by any NATO/ISAF spokespeople.
There is no pre-defined end date for the mission, only an end state: Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) able to provide security and sustain stability in Afghanistan without NATO/ISAF
support.
The development of credible, professional and legitimate ANSF, combined with the desires of
the Afghan government, will help to determine the exit timetable of NATO/ISAF forces.
SECTION IV – BACKGROUND
36. Opposing Militant Forces (OMF) - Militants - Taleban Extremists
NOTE: See also Headline Messages, footnote no.1
During the years of their rule the Taleban clearly demonstrated that they ruthlessly impose a
regime based on extremism and intolerance which carries out the most egregious violations of
human rights.
Not all violence can be attributed to the OMF / militants. Tribal conflict, land disputes, narco-
trafficking and general criminal activity all contribute to the overall security challenge.
Many of the rank and file OMF/ militants are locally recruited, although we are seeing an
increase in the number of foreign fighters. Money is a primary motivation, as well as a warrior
culture, and tribal rivalries. A minority core of OMF / militants, often with leadership roles, are
ideologically motivated.
The OMF / militants seek to:
Undermine the authority of the legitimate GIRoA. Their campaign of terror attacks is
designed to convince the people that their government cannot protect them.
Inflict a steady toll of NATO/ISAF casualties so that the troop contributing nations lose the
will to continue the fight and public support in their respective countries.
Create the conditions for ‘collateral damage’, civilian casualties, by launching attacks on
NATO/ISAF forces from behind a cloak of civilians.
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Prevent, through violence and intimidation, the Afghan people from benefiting from the R&D
the GIRoA, NATO/ISAF and the International Community can bring. Increasingly, they seek
to destroy new gains for the Afghan people by targetting roads, schools, bridges, etc.
Run a propaganda campaign designed to make themselves appear far more powerful than
they really are and falsely depict what conditions were like, and would be like, under
Taleban rule.
OMF / militants will not defeat NATO/ISAF on the battlefield – every time they have tried their
attacks have been decisively defeated with heavy losses to them – but they can be expected
to continue to try to achieve localised success by attacking ISAF / ANSF outposts or small
squads. Given their current military position, greater use of IEDs and suicide bombers is likely.
Despite the OMF / militants propaganda, they are not capable of any coordinated effort against
Kabul and do not have tha capability to launch sustained attacks against it or isolate the city.
As individuals, the OMF / militants leadership are wholly ill-equipped to govern in the best
interest of the people of Afghanistan. They offer nothing in terms of R&D, economic progress,
or improved healthcare or education. Their policies have been overwhelmingly rejected by
Afghans, both through elections and in polls.
37. The Afghanistan Compact
The Afghanistan Compact is a commitment to improve the lives of the Afghan people and to
contribute to national, regional and global peace and security.
The Afghanistan Compact succeeds the Bonn Agreement process.
It is the result of consultation between the GIRoA, the UN and the International Community.
Launched on 31 Jan 06, the Afghanistan Compact presents a framework for cooperation
between the International Community and the GIRoA, setting concrete benchmarks to be
achieved within the following five years.
The process is coordinated and monitored by the JCMB.
38. Joint Peace Jirga (JPJ)
The Joint Peace Jirga of 9-12 August 2007 marked a breakthrough in confidence building
between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The first time ever the two countries openly acknowledged
their desire to strengthen their anti-terrorist efforts and cooperation is an important step.
The GIRoA proved capable of planning, preparing and then safely and securely conducting a
complex international event. ISAF stood in support to the GIRoA.
The text of the Joint Declaration reads as follows:
(1) The Joint Peace Jirga strongly recognizes the fact that terrorism is a common threat to both
countries and the war on terror should continue to be an integral part of the national policies
and security strategies of both countries. The participants of this Jirga unanimously declare to
an extended, tireless and persistent campaign against terrorism and further pledge that
government and people of Pakistan and Afghanistan will not allow sanctuaries/training
centers for terrorists in their respective countries.
(2) The Joint Peace Jirga resolved to constitute a smaller Jirga, consisting of 25 prominent
members from each side that is mandated to strive to achieve the following objectives:
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a) Expedite the ongoing process of dialogue for peace and reconciliation with the
opposition.
b) Holding of regular meetings in order to monitor and oversee the implementation of the
decisions/recommendations of the Joint Peace Jirga.
c) Plan and facilitate convening of the next Joint Peace Jirgas.
d) Both countries will appoint 25 members each in the committee.
(3) The Joint Peace Jirga once again emphasizes the vital importance of brotherly relations in
pursuance of policies of mutual respect, non-interference and peaceful coexistence and
recommends further expansion of economic, social, and cultural relations between the two
countries.
(4) Members of the Joint Peace Jirga in taking cognizance of the nexus between narcotics and
terrorism condemn the cultivation, processing and trafficking of poppy and other illicit
substances and call upon the two governments to wage an all out war against this menace.
The Jirga takes note of the responsibilities of the international community in enabling
Afghanistan to provide alternative livelihood to the farmers.
(5) The governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the support of the international
community, should implement infrastructure, economic and social sector projects in the
affected areas.
(6) The comprehensive and important recommendations made by the five working committees of
the Joint Peace Jirga for implementation form part and parcel of this Joint Declaration.
39. The ASIA Foundation Survey – Afghanistan in 2007
Asia Foundation surveys have been conducted in 2004, 2006 and 2007. The latest survey,
issued in September 2007, was conducted among 6,263 respondents from all 34 Provinces of
Afghanistan providing a representative picture of Afghan public opinion.
There are further opinion polls available such as the one conducted by Manasia Research &
Analysis MRA/CSTC-A Command in July/August 2007 or by Charney Research of New York
on behalf of BBC, ABC and ARD in October/November 2007.
The ASIA Foundation Survey has been taken as an example on the grounds of statistical
validity. PA staff should draw from these polls as required. Digital versions of the polls may be
obtained through HQ NATO, PDD MOC. Key points from the ASIA foundation survey:
The mood of Afghans continues to be optimistic, with 42% saying that things are moving in
the right direction (44% in 2006). 24% think that the country is moving in the wrong
direction and 25% have mixed feelings.
Reconstruction cited as single biggest reason for country going in right direction (39%),
followed by good security (34%).
In 2006, rebuilding of the country was identified as only the 4th most important reason to
believe the country was headed in the right direction. This underscores the good pace at
which the reconstruction of the country is taking place.
Great deal or fair amount of confidence in institutions such as the Afghan National Army
and Afghan National Police (both more than 80%).
90% feel the ANA to be honest and fair with the Afghan people. 89% believe the ANA helps
to improve security.
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66% felt that security in their area was good or quite good, and 50% said they rarely or
never feared for their own or their family’s safety.
40. Facts and Figures
Commander ISAF, General David D. McKiernan, US Army, assumed command on 3 June
2008.
Total Number of ISAF Troops – Circa 50,700.
Forty-one nations - Albania, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia,Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, The
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates,
United Kingdom and the United States of America.
One additional nation (United Arab Emirates, UAE) has forces deployed with ISAF, but it has
not yet completed the formal process by which the NATO Council approves its participation in
ISAF.
NOTE for PAO: Jordan has requested not to be mentioned as an ISAF member state in the
public domain.
Switzerland withdrew from ISAF on 1 March 2008. Singapore and Ukraine have completed the
formal process to join ISAF. Thus the total number of nations participating in ISAF has risen
from 39 to 40.
12 nations are represented in Regional Command (North), 12 nations in RC(E), 18 nations in
RC(S), 11 nations in RC(W) and 16 nations in RC (C).
26 PRTs: 5 in RC(N), 4 in RC(W), 4 in RC(S) and 13 in RC(E).
ISAF Killed in Action (KIA) and Non Battle Death (NBD) by year as at 18 September 2008:
2002 0 KIA and 15 NBD
2003 6 KIA and 2 NBD
2004 3 KIA and 4 NBD
2005 4 KIA and 19 NBD
2006 58 KIA and 12 NBD
2007 143 KIA and 15 NBD
2008 143 KIA and 9 NBD
Afghanistan Profile: 650,000 sq km. Population 31.1 million (approx). Main ethnic groups:
Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, other
4%. Religions: Sunni Muslim 80%, Shia Muslim 19%, other 1%. Literacy: 36%.
41. Progress Since the Fall of the Taleban
Security
More than 66,000 ANA plus 78,000 ANP assigned.
More than 60,000 members of Illegally Armed Groups have been disarmed and more than
100,000 weapons have been collected.
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Governance
Presidential, Parliamentary and Provincial elections have taken place and women are now
sitting in the Afghan Parliament. 28% of the MPs of the Lower House are female.
Legitimate and representative government is now in place.
An estimated 4.8 million refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) have returned
home.
Poppy-free provinces in 2006: 6, in 2007: 14, planned by the end of 2008: 22 (out of 34).
Reconstruction & Development
The Afghan economy grew by 29% in 2002, 16% in 2003, 8% in 2004,14 % each in 2005
and 2006 and 13% in 2007. The fiscal year 2008/09 foresees a similar annual rate of
growth.
More than 4.5 million cell phone subscribers, up from zero in 2001.
There are 300 newspapers, 90 radio stations and 14 TV stations countrywide.
Current estimates are that there are now 661 basic health centres, 413 community medical
centres, 66 district hospitals and 33 provincial hospitals.
An estimated 35,000 children who would otherwise have died are alive thanks to the
immunisation programme and approximately 83% of the population now have access to
healthcare as opposed to an estimated 8% in 2001.
UNICEF efforts to improve neo and post-natal care have resulted in a 26% decline of infant
mortality and a 22% decline of under-5 mortality between 2002 and 2007. This means that
85,000 babies and children under age of 5 did not die in 2007.
Actually 350,000 children are vaccinated against polio
Over 2,000 schools have been built or refurbished since 2001; there are now 13 state
universities, 8 other state institutions of higher education and a dozen private universities
with 48,000 students countrywide. 20% of the students are female. For Kabul, these figures
include 5 institutions of higher education, 14 faculties and more than 10,000 students.
On 22 March, the school year 2008/9 started with roughly 44,000 trained personnel
teaching 6.2 million children (plus 0.5 million as compared to 2007/8), 40% of which are
girls. Under the Taleban, only 1.0 million boys were in school and girls were prohibited from
attending.
23 active teacher training colleges have enrolled around 9,500 students.
Over 14,500km of regional highways have been improved or asphalted since 2001 (as of
July 06) with an additional 530 km scheduled to be completed in 2008.
1,983 km of the Ring Road Network, i.e. 59%, has been reconstructed so far.
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[fireopal]

This major November, 2008 RAND Corporation study on intelligence operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, conducted 300 interviews at all levels with US, UK and Dutch intelligence officers and diplomats.

The 318 page document could be described as part of the "Pentagon Papers" for Iraq and Afghanistan. It was confidentially prepared for the Pentagon's Joint Forces Command and focuses on intelligence and counterinsurgency operations.

Marked "For Official Use Only" study was distribution restricted to a select group of Coalition war partners and Israel.

The study is a notable news and policy source, not for its arguments or conclusions, but rather for its wealth of candid and revealing interview quotes which are spread throughout the document, but especially in the 200 page appendix.

The material has been verified, and we ask readers to go through the document to extract key quotes for their communities. There is a wealth of interview quotes on almost every aspect of the wars. The authors of the quotes, ranging from the UK Ambassador and the former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency to on the ground intelligence officers, can be discovered via the footnote appendix.

Sample interview quotes:

The intelligence on the military side was not tied in with the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], and the CIA was not listened to. . . . I had my most depressing discussions with the intelligence people who could see what this was leading to, and could see what the pop- ulation thought better than [then-director of reconstruction and humanitarian assistance in Iraq L. Paul] Bremer could. . . . Between Bremer and [then secretary of state Donald H.] Rumsfeld, it had to be all talked up, which is the American way. . . . The discussion with Bremer was always on the optimistic side, while on the intelligence side it was much less so. And I think the same was true to an extent of [GEN John Philip Abizaid]. You don't succeed within the U.S. system unless you [display a can-do attitude].

In the military, . . . complex, divergent thinkers, either . . . bite their tongue or they get out.. . . Very, very rarely they get to be generals.

snatched two brothers who were sons of a sheikh [with whom we have very good relations.] They did coordinate it, but did so poorly. They said, Were coming by to pick up this guy named whatever and used a name that was so common the task force couldnt know who it was. . . . Hes still in jail, and Im trying to deal with their father, and I havent been able to find [the son]. . . . These guys go in and blow down doors . . . when all they need to do is knock and theyll let them in. . . . They killed the son in a Christian family. . . . They said [that the son] was reaching for a gun. Yeah, okay, he shouldnt have done that, but these guys blew down the door, blew through the wall, and came with all their toys.

(Afghanistan) infrastructure manning those responsible for planning infrastructure recoverywas only 650 strong out of 16,000 people at [U.S. Central Command].

Dutch F-16s would go out and fly missions [in Afghanistan], and after the missions they would ask for the BDA [battle-damage assessments], which were classified Secret U.S. They could fly the mission and drop the ordnance, but they couldnt get the battle-damage assessment.

The military would look and say, Its stable, so lets go someplace else. Well, maybe its stable because of the footprint we have there. . . . There is a rush to determine a snapshot of the security situation in order to reduce the footprint. . . . Were seeing an increase in violence in [this city] because they continue to decrease the number of soldiers there. . . . [When we started pulling out] the Iraqis themselves said, We are not ready yet.

We also spent a lot of time, money, blood, and treasure on going after MVTs [medium- value targets] and HVTs . . . and I dont think it had a great deal of effect on the Taliban because they are not hierarchical. If we killed one guy, they just replaced him in about 10minutes. . . . [In that regard,] they are not that different [from] us.

I think that not interfering would be interfering with our mission. We dealt with training the police and then sent them out to the community. If they werent paid, then they were extorting money at roadblocks. As the police are seen as coming out of our gates, eventu- ally the extortion is going to reflect on us. The average Afghan citizen is not able to discern that it is Kabul that is at fault. . . . The Taliban is capitalizing on this very fact, because it is a regression to the situation like it was back before 1994. Police extortion is one way the Taliban is winning over the population.

wikileaks.org/leak/rand-iraq-afhanistan-intel-2008.pdf