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Post by Sapphire Capital on Mar 12, 2009 22:52:26 GMT 4
The AIG Bailout William K. Sjostrom Jr. Northern Kentucky University - Salmon P. Chase College of Law March 5, 2009 Abstract: On February 28, 2008, American International Group, Inc. (AIG), the largest insurance company in the United States, announced 2007 earnings of $6.20 billion or $2.39 per share. Its stock closed that day at $50.15 per share. Less than seven months later, however, AIG was on the verge of bankruptcy and had to be rescued by the United States government through an $85 billion loan. Government aid has since grown to $200 billion. AIG's stock currently trades at less than $1.00 per share. The Article explains why AIG, a company with $1 trillion in assets and $95.8 billion in shareholders' equity, suddenly collapsed. It then details the terms of the government bailout, explores why it was undertaken, and questions its necessity. Finally, considering a likely legacy of AIG is increased regulation of credit default swaps, the Article describes the current regulatory landscape for CDSs, advocates restoring Securities and Exchange Commission power to regulate them, but cautions against regulating before the CDS market has had a chance to self-correct. papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1354251_code342221.pdf?abstractid=1346552&mirid=1
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Post by Laney on Mar 18, 2009 4:34:07 GMT 4
AIG Hires Renta-Cops to Protect Bankers Against “Mob Effect” Published on 03-17-2009
Source: The Washington Post
A tidal wave of public outrage over bonus payments swamped American International Group yesterday. Hired guards stood watch outside the suburban Connecticut offices of AIG Financial Products, the division whose exotic derivatives brought the insurance giant to the brink of collapse last year. Inside, death threats and angry letters flooded e-mail inboxes. Irate callers lit up the phone lines. Senior managers submitted their resignations. Some employees didn’t show up at all.
“It’s a mob effect,” one senior executive said. “It’s putting people’s lives in danger.”
Politicians and the public spent yesterday demanding that AIG rescind payouts that they said rewarded recklessness and greed at a company being bailed out with $170 billion in taxpayer funds. But company officials contend that the uproar is scaring away the very employees who understand AIG Financial Products’ complex trades and who are trying to dismantle the division before it further endangers the world’s economy.
“It’s going to blow up,” said a senior Financial Products manager, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak for the company. “I have a horrible, horrible, horrible feeling that this is going to end badly.”
President Obama yesterday vowed to “pursue every legal avenue to block these bonuses.” But that pledge might have come too late. About $165 million in retention payments started to go out Friday to employees at Financial Products, after numerous discussions with the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve.
Attorneys working for the Fed had been examining the matter for months and determined that the retention payments couldn’t be touched because AIG would face costly lawsuits and be subject to penalties from states and foreign governments. Administration officials said over the weekend that they agreed with that assessment.
AIG disclosed its retention-payment program more than a year ago, and the amount of the bonuses — more than $400 million for Financial Products alone — had been widely reported. But as the payments were coming due in recent days, the White House began to express its indignation.
Pressure on the 370-person Financial Products unit, based primarily in Connecticut and London, grew even more intense yesterday when New York Attorney General Andrew M. Cuomo threatened to issue subpoenas if the company failed to provide details about recipients of the retention payments.
The payments represent only the most contentious of a larger group of bonuses being paid throughout AIG. The company’s top seven officials, including chief executive Edward M. Liddy, agreed in November to forgo bonuses through this year.
After a Wednesday call between Liddy and Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner, AIG agreed to restructure payments for the next 43 highest-ranking officers at the company, who are to receive half of their bonuses — which total $9.6 million — immediately, one-quarter July 15 and the rest Sept. 15. The last two payments would depend on whether the company makes progress in restructuring its business and paying back taxpayers. In addition, the company is set to pay another $600 million in retention awards to about 4,700 people throughout its global insurance units.
But each dollar remains in question after the president’s reprimand yesterday and the deluge of rage from legislators and the American public. Government leaders already say they plan to recoup some of the bonus and retention pay while restructuring the company. In addition, administration officials said that the Treasury is planning to try to recover some of the bonus money by adding provisions to the additional $30 billion it gave AIG access to earlier this month.
The payment plan had been no secret.
Beginning in the first quarter of 2008, AIG disclosed the plan to offer retention awards at Financial Products. The unit had already begun to hemorrhage money, a problem that would later grow exponentially. The unit’s executives, fearing they might lose valuable employees in the tumultuous months to come, successfully negotiated more than $400 million for their workers, to be paid this month and again next year.
At the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which has directly overseen AIG since its federal takeover in September, officials have studied the possibility of rescinding or delaying the bonuses. They even brought in outside lawyers for advice. The conclusion: If the bonuses weren’t paid, the AIG staffers would be able to sue the company and probably would win, not just what they were owed but also punitive damages that would make the ultimate cost perhaps two to three times as high as the bonuses themselves.
Moreover, Fed officials also hope to keep current employees with the company. The senior executives whose decisions caused the company’s collapse are long gone. Most of those left behind are trying to unwind complicated derivative contracts. Completing that process correctly is essential to preserving as much value as possible for taxpayers, officials at both the government and AIG have argued. If it is mishandled, it could expose taxpayers to billions of dollars in additional losses.
Law professors agreed with the Fed’s assessment but said AIG employees could still agree to reduce their own bonuses.
And the outrage expressed by the president and lawmakers was designed to put pressure on these officers to do just that, the legal experts said.
Jonathan Macey, a professor at Yale Law School, said it was unlikely that any AIG employees would end up suing the company for changing compensation contracts, mainly because their names would be revealed publicly in a lawsuit and they would then be excoriated.
Macey added that the government is caught in a difficult position, squeezed between public outrage over the bonuses and the need to keep AIG Financial Products going so the company can restructure and the government can recoup some of its money.
“What’s good for AIG is definitely not good for the country,” Macey said. “But now that the government is invested, it may have to do what’s good for AIG.”
Liddy is scheduled to appear tomorrow in front of a House financial services subcommittee.
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Post by Engdahl on Mar 19, 2009 0:01:56 GMT 4
"Getting Tough" with Predator Financial Institutions; AIG, Larry Summers and the Politics of Deflection Published on 03-18-2009
Source: Global Research - F. William Engdahl
Finally the US authorities have gotten ‘tough’ with the predator financial institutions. The world has been waiting for such decisive intervention since an unending series of Government bailouts of financial institutions began early in 2008 amounting to now trillions of taxpayer dollars. Now, with the world’s largest insurance giant, AIG, the White House Economic Council chairman, Larry Summers has expressed ‘outrage.’ President Obama himself has entered the fray to promise ‘justice.’ US Senators have threatened a law to change the injustice. The only problem is they are all exercising ‘politics of deflection,’ taking attention away from the real problem, the fraudulent bailout.
The issue is over AIG announcing it was obligated to pay its traders in its high-risk London unit a sales bonus totaling $165 million for the year. Obama Treasury Secretary, Tim Geithner has announced a novel strategy for ‘justice.’ AIG will ‘reimburse’ the taxpayers up to $165 million for bonuses the company is giving employees. AIG will pay the Treasury an amount equal to the bonuses, and the Treasury will deduct that amount from the $30 billion in government (taxpayer) assistance that will soon go to the company. But he said that the Obama administration hasn't given up on efforts to recoup the money from the employees who got the bonuses. Good luck.
Larry Summers is the man directly responsible for the mess. As Clinton Treasury Secretary from 1999-January 2001 he shaped and pushed the financial deregulation that unleashed the present crisis. He was Treasury Secretary after July 1999 when his boss, Robert Rubin left to become Vice Chairman of Citigroup, where Rubin went on to advance the colossal agenda of deregulated finance directly.
As Treasury Secretary in 1999, Summers played a decisive role in pushing through the repeal of the Glass Steagall Act of 1933 that was instituted to guard against just the kind of banking abuses taxpayers now are having to bail out. Not only Glass-Steagall repeal. In 2000 Summers backed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act that incredibly mandated that financial derivatives, including in energy, could be traded between financial institutions completely without government oversight, ‘Over-the-Counter’ as in where the taxpayer is now being dragged. Credit default Swaps, at the center of the current storm, would not have been possible without Larry Summers and the Commodity Modernization Act of 2000. He is now the White House Economic Council chairman, mandated to find a solution to the crisis he helped make along with Tim Geithner, his friend who is Treasury chief. Foxes should never be asked to guard the henhouse.
Theatre of the absurd or deflection?
This all makes great food for tabloid headlines and popular outrage. They can write that elected politicians are finally acting in taxpayer interests. Until we look a bit more closely. Paying $165 million in employee bonuses or any amount for a company that is in the middle of a multi-trillion dollar fraud that is bringing the world economy down with it is ‘outrageous.’
The problem is the tax bailout haemmorrhage will go on. The reason is the Obama Administration like its predecessor refuses to take consequent action with AIG, despite the fact today the US Government owns at least 80% of AIG stock, bought for $180 billion of, yes, taxpayer dollars. To demand AIG ‘pay back the government’ is absurd as the government is in effect demanding it pay itself back with its own money. The latest claim that the Treasury will subtract the $165 million bonus money from the next $30 billion tranche it will give AIG says it all.
Preserving the CDS bubble
The political ‘outrage’ expressed by the Obama Administration is an example of ‘perception management.’ The population is being slylyduped into believing their officials are working in their interest. In reality the officials are channeling growing popular outrage over endless bank bailouts away from the real problem to an entirely tertiary one. The US Government has injected $180 billion since September 2008 to keep the ‘brain dead’ AIG in business and honoring its Credit Default Swap obligations. In effect, they are propping up the casino to continue endless gambling with taxpayer dollars.
The rise of a market in derivatives or ‘swaps’ contracts supposedly to ‘insure’ against a company going into default and not being able to honor its debts, the Credit Default Swaps market, is at the heart of the global financial catastrophe. The market was ‘invented’ by a young economist at JP MorganChase, interestingly enough one of the few big banks recording profit today.
As noted, CDS trading was created free from US Government regulation by President Clinton when he signed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 that mandated that financial derivatives not be under government regulation scrutiny. Enron crony and UBS bank adviser, Texas good ‘ol boy Congressman Phil Gramm helped pass the laws at a time his wife, Wendy headed the putative regulator, the Commodity Futures Trading Corporation (CFTC). That gave the green light to a derivatives market nominally worth more than $62 trillion in 2008. No one knows the exact size because this is a ‘phantom banking market’ completely private and between banks, so-called OTC for Over-The-Counter, ‘just between us.’
Michael Greenberger who headed the CFTC Division of Trading and Markets in the late 1990’s at the time of the financial deregulation acts, says that banks and hedge funds"were betting the subprimes would pay off and they would not need the capital to support their bets." The unregulated Credit Default Swaps, he says, have been at "the heart of the subprime meltdown. In 1998 Greenberger proposed regulating the growing derivatives market. At the prospect, he says, "all hell broke loose. The lobbyists for major commercial banks and investment banks and hedge funds went wild. They all wanted to be trading without the government looking over their shoulder."
The confidence between banks, the ‘just between us,’ collapsed after the ill-conceived decision by the US Government on September 15 2008 not to save the world’s fourth largest investment bank, Lehman Brothers. By then, there was no alternative but to nationalize and then sort out the mess. Bankruptcy, as the world now realizes, was not an option. But neither was the Henry Paulson TARP ‘casino rescue plan’ and Geithner’s continuation any option.
At the point the Government let Lehman Bros go down only months after saving the far smaller Bear Stearns and also AIG, not even a bank, there was no clear idea who would be saved and who not. No bank could afford to trust any other bank not to be holding just as risky loans as they. The crisis became a global systemic crisis. Notably, the man who participated in the decision to let Lehman Bros fail ‘to teach a lesson’ was then President of the New York Federal Reserve, US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner.
The US Government has stated that AIG cannot be allowed to fail, that, to use the jargon, AIG is ‘too big to fail.’ The reason the Government says it can’t let AIG fail is that if the company defaulted, hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of Credit-Default Swaps (CDS) would ‘blow up,’ and US and European banks whose toxic assets are supposedly insured by AIG would suddenly be sitting on immense losses. Quite the contrary, AIG is ‘too big to save’ under current rules of the game that have been written by Wall Street and the privately-owned Federal Reserve, Treasury Secretary Geithner’s former employer.
The CDS fraud
Credit Default Swaps purported, in theory, to let banks remove loan risk from their balance sheet onto others such as AIG, an insurer. It was based on a colossal fraud using flawed mathematical risk models.
AIG went big into the selling Credit Default Swaps with banks around the world, from its London ‘Financial Practices’ unit. AIG in effect issued pseudo ‘insurance’ for the hundreds of billions of dollars in new Asset Backed Securities (ABS) that Wall Street firms and banks like Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, Barclays were issuing, including Sub-prime Mortgage Backed Securities.
It was a huge Ponzi scheme built by AIG that depended on the fact the world’s largest insurance company held a rare AAA credit rating from Moody’s and S&P rating agencies. That meant AIG could borrow more cheaply than other companies with lower ratings
AIG issuing of CDS contracts acted as a form of insurance for the various exotic Asset Backed Securities (ABS) securities being issued by Wall Street and London banks. AIG was saying ‘if, by some remote chance’ those mortgage-backed securities suffered losses, AIG would pay the loss, not the banks.
Then it got really wild. Because credit-default swaps were not regulated, not even classed as a traditional insurance product, AIG didn’t have to set aside loss reserves! And it didn’t. So when housing prices started falling, and losses started piling up, it had no way to pay off.
AIG then issued of hundreds of billions of dollars worth of CDS instruments to allow banks to make their balance sheets look safer than they really were. Banks were able to get their loan risk low not by owning safer assets. They simply bought AIG’s credit-default swaps. The swaps meant that the risk of loss was transferred to AIG, making the bank portfolios look absolutely risk-free. That gave banks the legal illusion of BIS minimum capital requirements, so they could increase their leverage and buy yet more ‘risk-free’ assets.
How could that be allowed? The level of venal corruption in the Clinton and then Bush Administration rivals that of the last days of Rome before its fall from the internal rot of corruption. Banks invested billions in lobbying Washington politicians to get their way.
What can be done?
Fortunately there is a simple way out of the AIG debacle. The US Government can step in and fully nationalize AIG, 100%, kick out responsible management, declare AIG’s CDS contracts null and void and let holders sue the US government to regain value for what were in reality lottery gambles not loans to the real economy. They own 80% so the step is small to 100%. Doing that would end the global market in CDS and open the door for countless legal challenges. But AIG’s counterparties, as we begin to learn, were exactly the big Wall Street players like Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, even Deutsche Bank. They have gotten enough taxpayer bailouts to cover their risk in CDS. Let them recognize risk is the heart of banking, not the opposite.
Myron Scholes, the ‘father’ of financial derivatives, who won a Nobel Prize in economics in 1997 for inventing the stock options model that led to financial derivatives back in the 1970’s, has declared that derivatives and Credit Default Swaps have gotten so dangerously out of hand that authorities must ‘blow up’ the market.
Scholes says derivatives traded over the counter should be shut down completely. Speaking at York University Stern School of Business recently, he said the "solution is really to blow up or burn" the over-the-counter market and start over. He included derivatives on stocks, interest rate swaps and credit default swaps that should be then moved into regulated markets.
The idea is simple and not that radical. A US law banning OTC derivatives and moving them to regulated exchanges would end a colossal ‘shadow banking’ fraud. Banks would not lose much more than already, but the world financial system would get back to ‘normal.’ OTC derivatives are unregulated precisely to hide risk and enable fraud by the banks. It is past time to end that. There is where the US Treasury and other Governments must focus, not on meaningless ‘transparency’ calls or trading bonus ‘justice.’
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Post by Sapphire Capital on Mar 19, 2009 1:35:44 GMT 4
All the bonuses paid went to people working at: AIG Financial Products Corp. (AIGFP) Industry: Currency, Commodity & Futures Trading Website: www.aigfp.comA subsidiary of insurance giant American International Group, AIG Financial Products is a market maker and trader in over-the-counter derivatives of stocks, bonds, credit, and commodities as well as energy trading and foreign exchange markets. It operates outside the US through its subsidiary Banque AIG. It also offers economic research, pension strategies, online institutional trading, and municipal finance. In 2008 AIG Financial Products found itself at the center of controversy after its investments in credit default swaps, a type of debt insurance, collapsed. It was one of many woes that compelled the Federal Reserve to float an $85 billion emergency loan to its parent company to keep it solvent.
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Post by will on Mar 24, 2009 17:04:09 GMT 4
Guys,
My thoughts on this fiasco.
For those that did work or needed to be retain, they should receive their dues, as to those that did not deserve it, rightfully so should return at least half of what they have received.
The outcry is mainly a show, with political agendas behind the screens, and bad press did not help any.
Reminds me of the McCarthy trials and this time the voice of reason is not heard.
will
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Post by Florey on Mar 24, 2009 22:15:42 GMT 4
Will:
completely agree, the guys who worked have been blamed and wronged, I would not give a dime back, most live of the bonus, not the monthly payment, everyone in power seems to have known about the bonus, so the outrage is pretty fake to me, they should look how much TARP money makes it back to congress and senate
fl
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Post by MMM on Apr 14, 2009 1:16:23 GMT 4
AIG in spotlight over derivatives Published on 04-13-2009 Source: Financial Times
The unit that all but destroyed AIG has failed to sign up for the overhaul of the global derivatives market which was given added impetus by the troubles at the US insurance group.
AIG confirmed that its financial products unit, whose soured bets on credit default swaps forced the company into government hands last year, did not adopt the “Big Bang” protocol that has been signed by more than 2,000 market participants.
The protocol, created under the auspices of International Swaps & Derivatives Association, is intended to make it easier for investors in the opaque market for credit derivatives to know what will happen to their contracts if debt defaults occur. It came into force on Wednesday.
AIG Financial Products opted to eschew the protocol and make bilateral agreements with counterparties on more than 200 outstanding derivatives trades.
People close to the situation said the highly complex nature of many of AIG FP’s trades, particularly the credit default swaps on mortgage-backed securities, made it easier to negotiate with individual counterparties rather than adopt a catch-all protocol.
“We fully intend to adhere to the protocol but for technical reasons have decided to do so through bilateral agreements with our counterparties,” AIG said. Company officials added that for simpler transactions, such as CDSs written on individual corporate bonds, AIG FP would adopt a contract similar to the protocol.
AIG FP’s move raised eyebrows, with worries that because AIG is not a signatory to the new credit derivatives regime, it could choose not to abide by a credit event ruling.
Senior bankers and AIG downplay AIG FP’s absence from the protocol as the unit unwinds its legacy positions, runs down its portfolio and is no longer an active participant in the market.
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