Post by Sapphire Capital on Jul 16, 2008 6:31:20 GMT 4
The Executive Turnover Risk Premium
FLORIAN S. PETERS
University of Zurich
ALEXANDER F. WAGNER
University of Zurich - Swiss Banking Institute (ISB); Harvard University; Swiss Finance Institute May 29, 2008
Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 08-11
Abstract:
Executive compensation has increased dramatically over the past 15 years, but so has forced CEO turnover. We argue that part of the development of CEO pay can be explained by the adverse consequences that forced turnover implies for a CEO. We find that for the CEOs of the largest US corporations, a one percentage point increase in exogenous turnover risk is associated with $40,000 to $90,000 more in terms of total compensation. The size of this risk premium is in line with estimates of the importance of career concerns and forfeiture risk. This relation survives a test of reverse causation and controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity. We argue that the robustly positive correlation between turnover and compensation is not consistent with a view of entrenched CEOs setting their own compensation and turnover risk.
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1140713_code623849.pdf?abstractid=1140713&mirid=3
FLORIAN S. PETERS
University of Zurich
ALEXANDER F. WAGNER
University of Zurich - Swiss Banking Institute (ISB); Harvard University; Swiss Finance Institute May 29, 2008
Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 08-11
Abstract:
Executive compensation has increased dramatically over the past 15 years, but so has forced CEO turnover. We argue that part of the development of CEO pay can be explained by the adverse consequences that forced turnover implies for a CEO. We find that for the CEOs of the largest US corporations, a one percentage point increase in exogenous turnover risk is associated with $40,000 to $90,000 more in terms of total compensation. The size of this risk premium is in line with estimates of the importance of career concerns and forfeiture risk. This relation survives a test of reverse causation and controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity. We argue that the robustly positive correlation between turnover and compensation is not consistent with a view of entrenched CEOs setting their own compensation and turnover risk.
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1140713_code623849.pdf?abstractid=1140713&mirid=3