Post by Sapphire Capital on Jul 17, 2008 6:01:29 GMT 4
Natural Resources:
Views and Perspectives
Issue 2
BILLIONS OF CHINESE DOLLARS IN DRC:
Biyoya Makutu , Kinshasa April 2008
Introduction
On 17 September 2007, at Kinshasa’s Grand Hotel,
the Congolese Minister of State for Infrastructure,
Public Works and Reconstruction signed two
agreements with the Chief Executive Officer of a
group of Chinese companies.
Since that date the agreements are nowhere to be
seen. All that is known is that both agreements
concern the financing of the construction work for
basic infrastructure and the construction of a
motorway between the city of Lubumbashi and
Kasumbalesa. The investment amounts to a total of
five billion US dollars.
The daily newspaper Nouvel Elan, on Wednesday 19
September 2007 stated that, in the first agreement
on construction and modernization of
infrastructures, China will operate mines in the DRC’s
Katanga province in return for a financial
contribution to the national budget. In the second
agreement, the paper reported that the Chinese
company CREC will recover its money by a tollbooth
system. These agreements involve many sectors of
national economy including infrastructure, health,
education, energy, urban development and mining.
The objective of this funding is ostensibly the
sustainable development of DRC resources for the
benefit of its population.
Expected outcomes
Road and railway infrastructure
Scheduled works include: construction of the
Kinshasa – Ilebo railway and modernisation of the
Matadi – Kinshasa and Ilebo – Kananga – Mweneditu
and Lubumbashi – Sakania (3,213 km) lines. In the
past, this railway served to transport Gecamines
exports by sea through the Angolan ports of
Benguela and Lobito, and later through Taraza.
Today, these expensive routes will be used only to
transport people, since Katanga’s minerals are
exported by road via Zambia.
The construction of a highway between Lubumbashi
– Kasumbalesa (98 km), the construction of tarred
roads between Likasi – Kolwezi (176 km);
Lubumbashi – Kasomweno – Kilwa – Pweto
(526km); Pweto – Moba – Kalemie (433 km);
Kalemie – Fizi – Uvira – Bukavu (148 km); Bukavu
airport – Goma (175 km); Goma – Beni– Kasindi (440
km). Other sections include the following routes:
Beni – Komanda – Bunia (202 km); Mombasa –
Niania (226km); Niania – Bafwasende (141 km) for a
cumulative total of 3402 km. This will ensure DRC
integration into the East African region, which has
seen much conflict.
Besides these national roads, the agreements also
concern urban roads in provincial cities including the
capital city with 450 km.
Heath and education centres
Sino-Congolese co-operation also seeks to resolve
shortages of hospitals. It plans to build 31 fullyequipped
hospitals of 150 beds each, a hospital in
downtown Kinshasa, 145 fully-equipped health
centres of 50 beds each, 2 or 3 universities, and 5 000
homes.
China –DR Cooperation
The Chinese defined six principles that underlie their
co-operation. they are:
· win-win solutions;
· Job creation for the Congolese;
· Joint ventures in which the Congolese
companies will become contracting
authorities, while the Chinese companies will
be sub-contractors;
· Technology transfer to the Congolese;
· Environmental issues being taken into
account in the implementation of works, and
· Local integration for Chinese companies.
As can be seen, these principles are very vague and
general. They do not show clearly how the DRC is
going to avoid the potential damage arising from
such co-operation. For fifteen years previously, the
Congolese experienced the negative impacts of the
Japanese presence at SODIMIZA (Société de
Developpement Industriel et Minier du Zaïre - the
Zaïrean Industrial and Mining Development
Company) in Moshishi.
Opinions and issues relating to the
Chinese investment
In general, the DRC media and civil society have
expressed their opinions on this issue. There was
also a declaration issued by a member of the
Federation of Congolese Companies. A delegation of
this federation met with the prime minister to assess
how local companies could be involved in the
implementation of the programme.
Very few statements were issued by government,
aside from the press conference given by the
minister who signed the agreements, and,
occasionally, by the Finance Minister.
For the most part, these opinions favour the
investments, but, at the same time, express worries
about potential negative reactions on the part of the
Bretton Woods institutions and the European Union.
None of these opinions discuss the political economy
issues.
There is no analysis of the costs and risks of this
ambitious enterprise, nor has a geo-political analysis
been undertaken. In fact, no-one wants to take the
trouble to understand any of the impacts. Everyone
seems happy to see the discomfort of institutions like
the World Bank, IMF, the European Union and the
West as a whole.
At the signing of the agreement the Chinese invited
the Congolese government to diversify the cooperation
experience. This shows the limits of each
other’s intentions and will. The bottom line is that
this octopus-like co-operation causes more problems
than it resolves.
And perhaps that is the most important dimension –
the realisation that Chinese finance breaks down
national consensus around government
responsibilities to eradicate poverty by reviving
growth and development. The Democratic Republic
of Congo does not seem to be institutionally and
politically capable and ready for take-off. It gives the
impression of having been taken fifty years
backwards. Such a perspective cannot be
encouraging either to China or to the DRC’s
traditional partners.
Billions of dollars will not cure the problems faced by
the DRC. The country lacks a national driving force
for its development, and all those who rely on
minerals would do better to take action to
recondition the DRC with a view to establishing a
better future.
For example, when Freddy Mulongo, a civil society
representative, wonders why Chinese aid disturbs
the Congolese, he is also reminding the Congolese
that the DRC should rely on its own resources
because aid is not always beneficial. He calls on
government to protect national sovereignty in the
agreements with China, and also to cancel dubious
mining contracts inherited from times of war and
political transition. Freddy Mulongo does not want
the future of an entire nation to be mortgaged
through exploitation of Congolese natural resources.
3
A general spread of opinions on Chinese investment
can be seen in two banner headlines of a Kinshasa
daily newspapers Le Potentiel No. 4130 and 4151 of
Saturday 22 September and Wednesday 17 October
2007. They refer to the Chinese billions in the DRC as
being disruptive of Congolese relations with Belgium
on the one hand, and on the other hand, as something
bringing fear and panic to the West.
One article reads: “Officially, Belgium is disconcerted,
literally and figuratively. To make the best of a bad
job, Brussels is content to observe the marriage
between China and the DRC. Bretton Woods
institutions regard it with distaste, but stop short of
cursing it. The DRC owes explanations to the Bretton
Woods institutions. The last IMF mission in Kinshasa
also referred to the problem. The newspaper claimed
that donors have asked the IMF to request
clarification from the DRC government on the nature
of the loan. They fear that DRC may sink into a debt
spiral.
Other Kinshasa newspapers such as l’Avenir,
l’Observateur, le Phare, and Uhuru regard this
financial agreement as having sparked public debate.
However, it would be difficult to find in this
generalised debate any analysis. They offer no
economic policy, nor any development viewpoint.
No-one seeks to know whether the operation falls
within the government’s general economic policy,
nor whether it reflects current tendencies in the
economic or business world as imposed by the
globalization of the world economy. For example,
does the new Chinese co-operation, when compared
with co-operation with the IMF and World Bank,
give the DRC the capability of adding regional and
global dimensions to the national mineral economy?
An economic critique
The Congolese have the right to celebrate the signing
of an agreement that on the surface promises great
social benefits. Understandably, negative criticism
has been levelled against the traditional partnership
between with IMF/World Bank and the DRC, which
has not helped the Congolese people one iota. But the
question remains: was the Chinese agreement an
informed decision? There is no information from
government to illustrate this.
Since the Congolese government acts without soulsearching
in this matter, this raises questions about
the motives for the Chinese operations. It also
prompts us to consider the political and business
links which the Chinese have with the government’s
general economic policy, as embodied in its Growth
and Strategy Document on Poverty Reduction
(DCSRP).
The DRC is highly indebted, and hoping for external
debt reduction, but at the same time the country is
getting an important unconditional financial loan
from China. Is the DRC sending a message to its
traditional development partners, or is it simply
exercising bad economic judgment and decisionmaking?
This new Congolese economic policy orientation
needs to be understood and assessed. The Congolese
leadership has not rejected its continued partnership
with the Bretton Woods institutions. However, doubt
has crept into the relationship, and the Congolese are
disappointed with the lengthy procedures the
Washington institutions have imposed. Reacting in
despair, they may be turning to the Chinese in order
to keep some semblance of earlier electoral
promises. After all, the international monetary cooperation
has not brought the dividends which they
expected.
Are these the logical effects of the Congolese will to
own the democratic process?
The World Bank accepted introducing a growth
element in the strategy document
On poverty reduction. Didn’t that convince the
government of the legitimacy of development as the
only worthy struggle of a legitimate power, which the
World Bank would shelve as an option? Since the
best way to reduce poverty is through economic
growth, which in turn means creation of companies,
where then would resources to create growth come
from?
The AFDL political elite under the government of
President Laurent Désiré Kabila was already raising
questions about the IMF’s financial assistance when
it took power in Kinshasa in 1997. In his speech at
the 52nd UN General Assembly, the DRC Minister of
Foreign Affairs clearly asked why monetary cooperation
with the IMF and the World Bank makes
4
partner economies more insolvent every day? There
were no answers to this question except for
pressures to pay back contracted debt.
When IMF representatives fear that commitments
with China could only make the debt load heavier for
Congo, this sounds like a language disorder, because
that is exactly the aim of multilateral monetary
cooperation with the difference, however, that from
now on new loans will be socially justified through
the services that the population would enjoy.
There are also other opinions, which try to account
for the co-operation with China. These include the
business management style inherited from victories
of liberation struggles, aggressions, and armed
rebellions tainted with economic looting. The
predatory Congolese economic policy displays an
inability to resolve political and economic problems.
The system is unable to revive the nation and its
economy without ceasing to enrich the leaders. This
pattern is not far from the success stories of mafia
logic. An influential Congolese company made a deal
with Chinese companies to exploit a mining site for
an estimated amount of between 13 and 19 billion
US dollars.
Sub-contracting was given to the government in
order to avoid threats by NGOs who specialized in
blowing the whistle. [any evidence?]
The real problem raised by the Congolese is the
impact of the Bretton Woods institutions and their
policies. These policies could go beyond merely
giving advice and end up intervening to take over the
government’s 1999 mandate that its Treasury
manage national finances and the economy.
Successive governments since then have not
developed their own economic
policies, but instead have worked only to implement
the Washington consensus.
Didn’t the World Bank take advantage of the crisis to
open Congolese mines
and forests to world neo-liberalism? By so doing, it
stripped national institutions which, because of a lack
of autonomy and initiative, lost control of the
business. The management of the transition has
showed that,
despite the interventionist approach by the World
Bank, the Congolese economy guaranteed easy
enrichment for a predatory elite.
However, the weight of an externally assisted
management of the national
economy does not allow for any hope that the
Chinese billions will help transform the Congo’s
future. What is missing is any strategy, on the part of
the Congolese government, of a strategy, to allow for
the country as a whole to benefit from the Chinese
billions.
A political critique
Paradoxical as it looks, the debate on the financing
agreements between the Congolese government and
a grouping of Chinese companies needs political
analysis. What is interesting here is the fragile nature
of the DRC’s electoral consensus and its new
legitimate institutions.
The Chinese billions could create doubt and
constitute a significant new indebtedness which
might compromise the new legitimacy.
In principle, the government’s move towards China,
which is an attempt to materialise electoral promises,
could be seen as courageous, legitimate, and
beneficial.
Unfortunately, fear is suddenly all over the streets
and times are worrisome.
Instead of celebrating the event and praising the
government’s efforts, the
overwhelming impression is one of surprise and
divided public opinion, while the feeling among
officials was that the signing of the agreements was
rather unexpected and improvised.
Officially, the government can look to the erasure of
its external debt once the deadline is respected.
There are a number of things to be considered. There
is a need to examine the capacity for development of
this huge country where people are not prepared to
believe that economic and social development is first
and foremost a national concern. It is also time to
look at things in perspective and mitigate the success
of electoral operations which were given
5
international funding, increased the belief in the
nation’s dependency, and blocked any alternative
sense of the possibility of an independent Congolese
development.
Globalization does not make IMF and the World Bank
a new Zoe Arch of the 21st century. [I don’t
understand the reference to Zoe Arch – needs
explanation.]
Conclusion
In the light of this discussion, it is clear that the DRC
government should first work on developing its own
national vision of the world economy. The
government should include an assessment of the
positive and negative effects of regional and global
economic integration. This must be based on its own
freedom to undertake and define its future options
before diversifying its external dependence on
development funding. For an elected government,
the immediate priorities should not be the
undertaking of grandiose public works, but the
achievement of a sense of national hope through first
addressing humanitarian needs.
1 Professor Biyoya Makutu teaches International
Relations at the University of Kinshasa
Views and Perspectives
Issue 2
BILLIONS OF CHINESE DOLLARS IN DRC:
Biyoya Makutu , Kinshasa April 2008
Introduction
On 17 September 2007, at Kinshasa’s Grand Hotel,
the Congolese Minister of State for Infrastructure,
Public Works and Reconstruction signed two
agreements with the Chief Executive Officer of a
group of Chinese companies.
Since that date the agreements are nowhere to be
seen. All that is known is that both agreements
concern the financing of the construction work for
basic infrastructure and the construction of a
motorway between the city of Lubumbashi and
Kasumbalesa. The investment amounts to a total of
five billion US dollars.
The daily newspaper Nouvel Elan, on Wednesday 19
September 2007 stated that, in the first agreement
on construction and modernization of
infrastructures, China will operate mines in the DRC’s
Katanga province in return for a financial
contribution to the national budget. In the second
agreement, the paper reported that the Chinese
company CREC will recover its money by a tollbooth
system. These agreements involve many sectors of
national economy including infrastructure, health,
education, energy, urban development and mining.
The objective of this funding is ostensibly the
sustainable development of DRC resources for the
benefit of its population.
Expected outcomes
Road and railway infrastructure
Scheduled works include: construction of the
Kinshasa – Ilebo railway and modernisation of the
Matadi – Kinshasa and Ilebo – Kananga – Mweneditu
and Lubumbashi – Sakania (3,213 km) lines. In the
past, this railway served to transport Gecamines
exports by sea through the Angolan ports of
Benguela and Lobito, and later through Taraza.
Today, these expensive routes will be used only to
transport people, since Katanga’s minerals are
exported by road via Zambia.
The construction of a highway between Lubumbashi
– Kasumbalesa (98 km), the construction of tarred
roads between Likasi – Kolwezi (176 km);
Lubumbashi – Kasomweno – Kilwa – Pweto
(526km); Pweto – Moba – Kalemie (433 km);
Kalemie – Fizi – Uvira – Bukavu (148 km); Bukavu
airport – Goma (175 km); Goma – Beni– Kasindi (440
km). Other sections include the following routes:
Beni – Komanda – Bunia (202 km); Mombasa –
Niania (226km); Niania – Bafwasende (141 km) for a
cumulative total of 3402 km. This will ensure DRC
integration into the East African region, which has
seen much conflict.
Besides these national roads, the agreements also
concern urban roads in provincial cities including the
capital city with 450 km.
Heath and education centres
Sino-Congolese co-operation also seeks to resolve
shortages of hospitals. It plans to build 31 fullyequipped
hospitals of 150 beds each, a hospital in
downtown Kinshasa, 145 fully-equipped health
centres of 50 beds each, 2 or 3 universities, and 5 000
homes.
China –DR Cooperation
The Chinese defined six principles that underlie their
co-operation. they are:
· win-win solutions;
· Job creation for the Congolese;
· Joint ventures in which the Congolese
companies will become contracting
authorities, while the Chinese companies will
be sub-contractors;
· Technology transfer to the Congolese;
· Environmental issues being taken into
account in the implementation of works, and
· Local integration for Chinese companies.
As can be seen, these principles are very vague and
general. They do not show clearly how the DRC is
going to avoid the potential damage arising from
such co-operation. For fifteen years previously, the
Congolese experienced the negative impacts of the
Japanese presence at SODIMIZA (Société de
Developpement Industriel et Minier du Zaïre - the
Zaïrean Industrial and Mining Development
Company) in Moshishi.
Opinions and issues relating to the
Chinese investment
In general, the DRC media and civil society have
expressed their opinions on this issue. There was
also a declaration issued by a member of the
Federation of Congolese Companies. A delegation of
this federation met with the prime minister to assess
how local companies could be involved in the
implementation of the programme.
Very few statements were issued by government,
aside from the press conference given by the
minister who signed the agreements, and,
occasionally, by the Finance Minister.
For the most part, these opinions favour the
investments, but, at the same time, express worries
about potential negative reactions on the part of the
Bretton Woods institutions and the European Union.
None of these opinions discuss the political economy
issues.
There is no analysis of the costs and risks of this
ambitious enterprise, nor has a geo-political analysis
been undertaken. In fact, no-one wants to take the
trouble to understand any of the impacts. Everyone
seems happy to see the discomfort of institutions like
the World Bank, IMF, the European Union and the
West as a whole.
At the signing of the agreement the Chinese invited
the Congolese government to diversify the cooperation
experience. This shows the limits of each
other’s intentions and will. The bottom line is that
this octopus-like co-operation causes more problems
than it resolves.
And perhaps that is the most important dimension –
the realisation that Chinese finance breaks down
national consensus around government
responsibilities to eradicate poverty by reviving
growth and development. The Democratic Republic
of Congo does not seem to be institutionally and
politically capable and ready for take-off. It gives the
impression of having been taken fifty years
backwards. Such a perspective cannot be
encouraging either to China or to the DRC’s
traditional partners.
Billions of dollars will not cure the problems faced by
the DRC. The country lacks a national driving force
for its development, and all those who rely on
minerals would do better to take action to
recondition the DRC with a view to establishing a
better future.
For example, when Freddy Mulongo, a civil society
representative, wonders why Chinese aid disturbs
the Congolese, he is also reminding the Congolese
that the DRC should rely on its own resources
because aid is not always beneficial. He calls on
government to protect national sovereignty in the
agreements with China, and also to cancel dubious
mining contracts inherited from times of war and
political transition. Freddy Mulongo does not want
the future of an entire nation to be mortgaged
through exploitation of Congolese natural resources.
3
A general spread of opinions on Chinese investment
can be seen in two banner headlines of a Kinshasa
daily newspapers Le Potentiel No. 4130 and 4151 of
Saturday 22 September and Wednesday 17 October
2007. They refer to the Chinese billions in the DRC as
being disruptive of Congolese relations with Belgium
on the one hand, and on the other hand, as something
bringing fear and panic to the West.
One article reads: “Officially, Belgium is disconcerted,
literally and figuratively. To make the best of a bad
job, Brussels is content to observe the marriage
between China and the DRC. Bretton Woods
institutions regard it with distaste, but stop short of
cursing it. The DRC owes explanations to the Bretton
Woods institutions. The last IMF mission in Kinshasa
also referred to the problem. The newspaper claimed
that donors have asked the IMF to request
clarification from the DRC government on the nature
of the loan. They fear that DRC may sink into a debt
spiral.
Other Kinshasa newspapers such as l’Avenir,
l’Observateur, le Phare, and Uhuru regard this
financial agreement as having sparked public debate.
However, it would be difficult to find in this
generalised debate any analysis. They offer no
economic policy, nor any development viewpoint.
No-one seeks to know whether the operation falls
within the government’s general economic policy,
nor whether it reflects current tendencies in the
economic or business world as imposed by the
globalization of the world economy. For example,
does the new Chinese co-operation, when compared
with co-operation with the IMF and World Bank,
give the DRC the capability of adding regional and
global dimensions to the national mineral economy?
An economic critique
The Congolese have the right to celebrate the signing
of an agreement that on the surface promises great
social benefits. Understandably, negative criticism
has been levelled against the traditional partnership
between with IMF/World Bank and the DRC, which
has not helped the Congolese people one iota. But the
question remains: was the Chinese agreement an
informed decision? There is no information from
government to illustrate this.
Since the Congolese government acts without soulsearching
in this matter, this raises questions about
the motives for the Chinese operations. It also
prompts us to consider the political and business
links which the Chinese have with the government’s
general economic policy, as embodied in its Growth
and Strategy Document on Poverty Reduction
(DCSRP).
The DRC is highly indebted, and hoping for external
debt reduction, but at the same time the country is
getting an important unconditional financial loan
from China. Is the DRC sending a message to its
traditional development partners, or is it simply
exercising bad economic judgment and decisionmaking?
This new Congolese economic policy orientation
needs to be understood and assessed. The Congolese
leadership has not rejected its continued partnership
with the Bretton Woods institutions. However, doubt
has crept into the relationship, and the Congolese are
disappointed with the lengthy procedures the
Washington institutions have imposed. Reacting in
despair, they may be turning to the Chinese in order
to keep some semblance of earlier electoral
promises. After all, the international monetary cooperation
has not brought the dividends which they
expected.
Are these the logical effects of the Congolese will to
own the democratic process?
The World Bank accepted introducing a growth
element in the strategy document
On poverty reduction. Didn’t that convince the
government of the legitimacy of development as the
only worthy struggle of a legitimate power, which the
World Bank would shelve as an option? Since the
best way to reduce poverty is through economic
growth, which in turn means creation of companies,
where then would resources to create growth come
from?
The AFDL political elite under the government of
President Laurent Désiré Kabila was already raising
questions about the IMF’s financial assistance when
it took power in Kinshasa in 1997. In his speech at
the 52nd UN General Assembly, the DRC Minister of
Foreign Affairs clearly asked why monetary cooperation
with the IMF and the World Bank makes
4
partner economies more insolvent every day? There
were no answers to this question except for
pressures to pay back contracted debt.
When IMF representatives fear that commitments
with China could only make the debt load heavier for
Congo, this sounds like a language disorder, because
that is exactly the aim of multilateral monetary
cooperation with the difference, however, that from
now on new loans will be socially justified through
the services that the population would enjoy.
There are also other opinions, which try to account
for the co-operation with China. These include the
business management style inherited from victories
of liberation struggles, aggressions, and armed
rebellions tainted with economic looting. The
predatory Congolese economic policy displays an
inability to resolve political and economic problems.
The system is unable to revive the nation and its
economy without ceasing to enrich the leaders. This
pattern is not far from the success stories of mafia
logic. An influential Congolese company made a deal
with Chinese companies to exploit a mining site for
an estimated amount of between 13 and 19 billion
US dollars.
Sub-contracting was given to the government in
order to avoid threats by NGOs who specialized in
blowing the whistle. [any evidence?]
The real problem raised by the Congolese is the
impact of the Bretton Woods institutions and their
policies. These policies could go beyond merely
giving advice and end up intervening to take over the
government’s 1999 mandate that its Treasury
manage national finances and the economy.
Successive governments since then have not
developed their own economic
policies, but instead have worked only to implement
the Washington consensus.
Didn’t the World Bank take advantage of the crisis to
open Congolese mines
and forests to world neo-liberalism? By so doing, it
stripped national institutions which, because of a lack
of autonomy and initiative, lost control of the
business. The management of the transition has
showed that,
despite the interventionist approach by the World
Bank, the Congolese economy guaranteed easy
enrichment for a predatory elite.
However, the weight of an externally assisted
management of the national
economy does not allow for any hope that the
Chinese billions will help transform the Congo’s
future. What is missing is any strategy, on the part of
the Congolese government, of a strategy, to allow for
the country as a whole to benefit from the Chinese
billions.
A political critique
Paradoxical as it looks, the debate on the financing
agreements between the Congolese government and
a grouping of Chinese companies needs political
analysis. What is interesting here is the fragile nature
of the DRC’s electoral consensus and its new
legitimate institutions.
The Chinese billions could create doubt and
constitute a significant new indebtedness which
might compromise the new legitimacy.
In principle, the government’s move towards China,
which is an attempt to materialise electoral promises,
could be seen as courageous, legitimate, and
beneficial.
Unfortunately, fear is suddenly all over the streets
and times are worrisome.
Instead of celebrating the event and praising the
government’s efforts, the
overwhelming impression is one of surprise and
divided public opinion, while the feeling among
officials was that the signing of the agreements was
rather unexpected and improvised.
Officially, the government can look to the erasure of
its external debt once the deadline is respected.
There are a number of things to be considered. There
is a need to examine the capacity for development of
this huge country where people are not prepared to
believe that economic and social development is first
and foremost a national concern. It is also time to
look at things in perspective and mitigate the success
of electoral operations which were given
5
international funding, increased the belief in the
nation’s dependency, and blocked any alternative
sense of the possibility of an independent Congolese
development.
Globalization does not make IMF and the World Bank
a new Zoe Arch of the 21st century. [I don’t
understand the reference to Zoe Arch – needs
explanation.]
Conclusion
In the light of this discussion, it is clear that the DRC
government should first work on developing its own
national vision of the world economy. The
government should include an assessment of the
positive and negative effects of regional and global
economic integration. This must be based on its own
freedom to undertake and define its future options
before diversifying its external dependence on
development funding. For an elected government,
the immediate priorities should not be the
undertaking of grandiose public works, but the
achievement of a sense of national hope through first
addressing humanitarian needs.
1 Professor Biyoya Makutu teaches International
Relations at the University of Kinshasa