Post by Sapphire Capital on Aug 1, 2008 2:40:53 GMT 4
Empire Building and Fiscal Illusion? An Empirical Study of Government Official Behaviors in Takings
Yun-Chien Chang
New York University - School of Law
July 2008
NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 08-32
Abstract:
The takings literature debates whether government officials minimize takings compensation or paying compensation to the extent that it maximizes their political interests. But there has been no empirical study. Besides, two assessment methods of takings compensation one implemented by American states, the other proposed by scholars have been empirically found to award inaccurate takings compensations to condemnees. There is no empirical research, however, on a third assessment method, implemented in Taiwan.
Using data of takings compensation and market value from Taiwan 2000-2007, I empirically examined whether the Taiwan assessment method (as takings compensations are pre-determined by annual governmental assessments of property value) produces accurate compensation, and whether government officials minimize compensation or maximize their political interests. I found that about two-thirds of the takings compensations in Taiwan were below market value and, therefore, inaccurate. Government officials can further reduce compensation payment but have failed to do so. Condemnees were under-compensated because the more politically influential landowners pressured the government to distort governmental assessments of property value to reduce tax burden. Political interests are government officials' main concern.
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1161229_code419245.pdf?abstractid=1101834&mirid=3
Yun-Chien Chang
New York University - School of Law
July 2008
NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 08-32
Abstract:
The takings literature debates whether government officials minimize takings compensation or paying compensation to the extent that it maximizes their political interests. But there has been no empirical study. Besides, two assessment methods of takings compensation one implemented by American states, the other proposed by scholars have been empirically found to award inaccurate takings compensations to condemnees. There is no empirical research, however, on a third assessment method, implemented in Taiwan.
Using data of takings compensation and market value from Taiwan 2000-2007, I empirically examined whether the Taiwan assessment method (as takings compensations are pre-determined by annual governmental assessments of property value) produces accurate compensation, and whether government officials minimize compensation or maximize their political interests. I found that about two-thirds of the takings compensations in Taiwan were below market value and, therefore, inaccurate. Government officials can further reduce compensation payment but have failed to do so. Condemnees were under-compensated because the more politically influential landowners pressured the government to distort governmental assessments of property value to reduce tax burden. Political interests are government officials' main concern.
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1161229_code419245.pdf?abstractid=1101834&mirid=3