Post by Sapphire Capital on Aug 4, 2008 20:08:52 GMT 4
Supreme Court Auditing of the US Courts of Appeals: An Organizational Perspective
Stefanie A. Lindquist
Vanderbilt University - School of Law; Vanderbilt University - Department of Political Science
Susan Haire
University of Georgia
Donald R. Songer
University of South Carolina
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 17, Issue 4, pp. 607-624, 2007
Abstract:
Using an aggregate-level model of Supreme Court-circuit court interactions, this study assesses the extent to which the Court's auditing process of circuit court outputs is shaped by organizational dynamics such as structural capacity, institutionalization, and demographic characteristics. Principals in organizational hierarchies must audit the behavior of their agents to ensure that the agents are faithfully complying with the principals' preferences. In the case of the Supreme Court, such auditing activities must take place in the face of very limited institutional capacity on the Court's part. We propose that the Court considers certain broad organizational and institutional characteristics at the circuit level when performing this task. In particular, we find that the Court strategically allocates its limited institutional resources to audit decisions to respond to its recent interactions with individual circuits in past terms, the circuits' internal decision-making dynamics (including dissent and reversal rates), and goal conflict between the circuit and the Supreme Court.
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1157236
Stefanie A. Lindquist
Vanderbilt University - School of Law; Vanderbilt University - Department of Political Science
Susan Haire
University of Georgia
Donald R. Songer
University of South Carolina
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 17, Issue 4, pp. 607-624, 2007
Abstract:
Using an aggregate-level model of Supreme Court-circuit court interactions, this study assesses the extent to which the Court's auditing process of circuit court outputs is shaped by organizational dynamics such as structural capacity, institutionalization, and demographic characteristics. Principals in organizational hierarchies must audit the behavior of their agents to ensure that the agents are faithfully complying with the principals' preferences. In the case of the Supreme Court, such auditing activities must take place in the face of very limited institutional capacity on the Court's part. We propose that the Court considers certain broad organizational and institutional characteristics at the circuit level when performing this task. In particular, we find that the Court strategically allocates its limited institutional resources to audit decisions to respond to its recent interactions with individual circuits in past terms, the circuits' internal decision-making dynamics (including dissent and reversal rates), and goal conflict between the circuit and the Supreme Court.
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1157236