Post by Sapphire Capital on Aug 5, 2008 22:11:55 GMT 4
Risk Rationing and Wealth Effects in Credit Markets: Theory and Implications for Agricultural Development
Steve Boucher
University of California, Davis - Departments of Economics and Agricultural Resource Economics
Michael R. Carter
University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Agricultural & Applied Economics
Catherine Guirkinger
University of Namur - Department of Economics
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 90, No. 2, pp. 409-423, May 2008
Abstract:
We develop a model that shows that asymmetric information can result in two types of credit rationing: conventional quantity rationing, and risk rationing, whereby farmers are able to borrow but only under high-collateral contracts that offer them lower expected well-being than a safe, subsistence activity. After exploring its incidence with respect to wealth, we show that risk rationing has important policy implications. Specifically, land titling will be only partially effective because it does not enhance producers' willingness to offer up the collateral needed to secure loans under moral hazard constraints. Efforts to enhance agricultural investment and the working of agricultural credit markets must step beyond land titling and also deal with risk.
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1119007
Steve Boucher
University of California, Davis - Departments of Economics and Agricultural Resource Economics
Michael R. Carter
University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Agricultural & Applied Economics
Catherine Guirkinger
University of Namur - Department of Economics
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 90, No. 2, pp. 409-423, May 2008
Abstract:
We develop a model that shows that asymmetric information can result in two types of credit rationing: conventional quantity rationing, and risk rationing, whereby farmers are able to borrow but only under high-collateral contracts that offer them lower expected well-being than a safe, subsistence activity. After exploring its incidence with respect to wealth, we show that risk rationing has important policy implications. Specifically, land titling will be only partially effective because it does not enhance producers' willingness to offer up the collateral needed to secure loans under moral hazard constraints. Efforts to enhance agricultural investment and the working of agricultural credit markets must step beyond land titling and also deal with risk.
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1119007